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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of two essays on the determinants and innovation consequences 
of alliance partner choice. To narrow down the scope of alliance partner choices, I focus 
on how a focal firm and a partner firm are connected in their network. To understand the 
relational connection, I use the notion of alliance partner network distance, which refers 
to how far away the partner is from the focal firm in the network.  Methodologically, the 
notion of alliance partner network distance is captured by the shortest alternative path to 
the partner firm from the focal firm in the time period prior to alliance formation. 
Theoretically, network distance explains the social mechanism and the characteristics of 
information flowing between the two firms. If there is a mutual partner between the two 
firms (i.e., a close partner), the relational risk is reduced (Coleman, 1988), and the 
novelty of information coming from an unconnected partner (i.e., a distant partner) is 
higher than that from a connected partner (Burt, 1992). 
This dissertation examines the effects of corporate governance on network 
distance as a determinant of alliance partner network distance in the first essay and the 
innovation consequences of alliance partner network distance in the second essay. 
Drawing on multiple managerial perspectives and an innovation perspective, taken 
together, the essays in this dissertation provide a comprehensive understanding of 
alliance partner choices.   
 In the first essay, entitled “Determinants of Alliance Partner Choice: Alliance 
Partner Network Distance and Agency Theory," I argue that an agency problem is 
involved in alliance partner choice, in particular between distant partners and close 
partners, as a determinant of alliance partner selection. I ask if managerial opportunism 
vi 
 
may be a significant problem in the alliance partner choice and examine the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms designed to address agency problems in explaining 
alliance partner network distance. I propose that the increased relational risk of allying 
with distant partners may be mitigated by managerial incentives and monitoring by 
outsider directors. Using a sample of 310 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology industries from 1996 to 2010, I find support for the presence and 
mitigation of agency hazards in alliance partner choice. Firms tend to form alliances with 
close partners to avoid employment and other risks, which are mitigated by managerial 
ownership and outside director ownership. In addition, managerial tenure moderates the 
relationship between network distance and managerial incentives, and the relationship 
between network distance and board monitoring. This study makes a theoretical 
contribution to the body of literature on alliance partner choice by adding a new lens of 
agency hazards.   
 The second essay, entitled “How Does an Alliance Partner Network Distance 
Affect a Firm's Innovation?” investigates how an alliance partner’s network distance 
affects a firm's innovation. I propose that an alliance with a distant partner contributes to 
exploratory innovation and better-quality innovation with novel and non-redundant 
information from the distant partner, while an alliance with a close partner contributes to 
innovation quantity based on social capital with the close partner. Technological distance 
substitutes network distance for innovation quality. I test the effect of alliance partner 
network distance on innovation with 534 R&D alliances of 189 firms in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries in the U.S. between 1996 and 2009. This 
study makes theoretical contributions to the literature on innovation by addressing the 
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conflicting theories about the benefits of social capital and the benefits of novel 
information.  
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION   
1.1 Research Background and Research Objectives  
This dissertation examines the determinants and consequences of an alliance partner 
choice. It particularly examines the effects of corporate governance on the network 
partner choice and the effects of alliance partners on firms’ innovation in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the U.S.  
Among many aspects of partner choice, I investigate the alliance partner choice 
from a network perspective by using the notion of alliance partner network distance in 
my dissertation. Conceptually, alliance partner network distance refers to the underlying 
network structure in a dyad between a focal firm and a partner firm, considering both the 
direct and indirect ties of firms. Methodologically, the network distance between a focal 
firm and its new partner is an alternative minimum path length (geodesic) between the 
partner and the focal firm; therefore, a close partner is connected to a focal firm through a 
mutual partner, while a distant partner and a focal firm do not share a mutual partner.  
Theoretically, network distance explains the social mechanism available between two 
firms and the characteristics of information flowing between the two firms. If there is a 
mutual partner between the two firms (i.e., a close partner), the relational risk is reduced 
(Coleman, 1988) and the novelty of information coming from an unconnected partner 
(i.e., a distant partner) is higher than that from a connected partner (Burt, 1992).  
The notion of alliance partner network distance is theoretically distinctive from 
network transitivity (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). Network transitivity refers to the 
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mechanism by which a focal firm gains resources from a tie that improves the value that 
the actor derives from an exchange with an independent third relation (Uzzi & Gillespie, 
2002). Network transitivity suggests that a relationship with a distant partner is also based 
on a social mechanism, which comes from other existing alliances of the focal firm, 
contrary to the theory of the notion of alliance partner network distance explained above. 
I suggest that the assumptions that the notion of network transitivity is based on are not 
valid in an inter-firm alliance context of my theory. A relationship between firms is 
difficult to simply define as an embedded relationship without taking into account the 
various aspects of relationships. In addition, what firms learn or obtain from a 
relationship is not easily transferred to another relationship given the complex 
characteristics of information and knowledge exchanged within each alliance.       
Despite a large body of literature on alliance partner choice, gaps remain in our 
understanding of alliance partner decisions. There are two conflicting literature streams 
that examine alliance partner choice from a network perspective. One stream confirms 
firms’ propensity to ally with embedded ties and suggests that firms tend to choose 
partners from embedded ties due to concerns about relational risk. The other stream 
explores when firms form nonlocal ties, given that such nonlocal ties help firms 
overcome their myopia of learning (Levinthal & March, 1993).  
As determinants to form ties with nonlocal partners, the impact of managerial 
opportunism has been ignored in the literature on alliance partner choice. Top managers 
are involved in alliance formation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee & Park, 2008; 
Dickson & Weaver, 1997) and their adverse managerial motives may partially account 
for such alliance outcomes. Therefore, they may use alliance strategies to obtain private 
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benefits at the expense of shareholders' interests. Whereas agency theory has been 
applied to various strategic decisions such as divestiture, M&A, internationalization and 
R&D investment, the alliance literature has implicitly assumed that the interests of agent 
managers regarding alliances are aligned with those of shareholders. 
Despite the considerable attention paid to the effects of network structures on 
firms, another gap is that previous research has yielded conflicting results about the 
influence of alliance partners’ social capital and the information the partners bring 
concerning firm innovation between the benefits of structural holes (Burt, 1992) and 
those of closure (Coleman, 1988). A plausible reason for these conflicting results is that 
most studies have focused on the structural aspect of the network and have largely 
overlooked network evolution. Controlling for the existing network structure, no 
investigation has examined how an additional alliance formation, rather than the 
cumulated effect of all of the alliances, affects innovation.  
Another reason for the mixed results is that the literature on networks and 
innovation focuses on only one aspect of innovation: either innovation output (Ahuja, 
2000) or innovation characteristics (i.e., exploratory innovation by Phelps, 2010), even 
though a different network structure can affect different types of innovation. In my 
dissertation, I explore the effect of an additional tie, alliance partner network distance, on 
various types of innovation with a network dynamic perspective since this additional tie 
may change the existing network structure. 
To fill the literature gap on partner choice, the current dissertation attempts to 
answer the following questions: 1) What are the determinants of alliance partner choice? 
and 2) How does alliance partner network distance affect firms’ innovation?  
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1.2 Key Findings of the Dissertation  
This dissertation consists of two essays, which are briefly summarized below. The first 
essay examines the effects of corporate governance on alliance partner network distance, 
and the second essay looks at the relationship between alliance partner network distance 
and a focal firm’s innovation.   
The key argument in Essay 1 is that appropriate corporate governance to mitigate 
agency problems increases the alliance partner network distance. Managers typically 
prefer alliances with close partners since relationships with distance partners lack an 
effective social mechanism leading to alliance failure. Since top managers have so much 
of their economic and human capital as well as their reputations tied to their firms, their 
interests are relatively “underdiversified.” Thus, top managers worry too much about the 
downside and losses that may harm their own employment. This concern prevents them 
from allying with distant partners who are relationally riskier. However, alliances with 
distant partners that bring novel information are beneficial for long-term innovation. To 
discourage managers' risk aversion, firms strengthen corporate governance by offering 
ownership incentives and building monitoring systems. I focus on two aspects of 
corporate governance: managerial stock ownership as managerial ownership, and external 
director ownership as nonexecutive monitoring. Overall, the results show that corporate 
governance to address agency problems encourages agent managers to pursue alliances 
with distant partners. Managerial tenure moderates the relationship between alliance 
partner network distance and managerial incentives and board monitoring.   
In Essay 2, I look at three aspects of innovation as innovation consequences: 
innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, and innovation quality. To address the 
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mixed results of prior research about the effects of alliances and alliance networks on 
innovation, I explore various types of innovation. I argue that trust, which is strongly 
available in relationships with close partners, leads to better innovation quantity, since 
trust with partners increases their willingness to share knowledge and similarity with 
close partners leads to quick production of innovative output. On the other hand, novel 
and non-redundant information from distant partners helps firms depart from path-
dependence learning leading to exploratory innovation. In addition, I explore a 
moderating effect of technological distance on the relationship between alliance network 
distance and different types of innovation. Alliances with partners, both technologically 
and relationally distant, lead to better quality innovations and decrease exploratory 
innovations.     
While these two essays are independent studies, they are significantly 
complementary. Essay 1, which discusses the antecedents of network distance, suggests 
that the interests of managers may not be aligned with those of shareholders regarding 
their alliance partner choices. By providing the innovation performance of network 
partner distance, Essay 2 provides an empirical test of the implications of the alliance 
partner choice that was investigated in Essay 1. Thus, Essay 2 allows us to test whether 
the decisions about alliance partner choice are consistent with the arguments developed in 
Essay 1. In addition, Essay 2 tests the premise of Essay 1 that alliances with distant 
partners will benefit long-term innovation and that board of directors and managers with 
ownership prefer distant partners.  
A second commonality connecting the two essays is how social capital (trust) 
with a close partner and the novel information provided by a distant partner affect firms. 
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In Essay 1, I argue that agent managers are more dependent on the social capital of a 
close partner rather than novel information associated with long-term performance. In 
Essay 2, I emphasize both close and distant partners and show that firms should ally with 
both close and distant partners for both short- and long-term innovation. For each essay, I 
provide a brief summary of the motivation and research questions, a synopsis of the main 
arguments and hypotheses, findings, and a discussion of the potential contributions. 
Figure 1-1 presents a summary of the hypotheses and the theoretical framework of the 
dissertation.    
 
1.3 Importance and Contribution of the Dissertation  
The current dissertation makes four contributions. First, I extend prior literature on 
partner choice by adding the notion of alliance partner network distance of nonlocal ties 
relative to the prior literature which only distinguishes between new and existing partners 
(Beckman et al., 2004). Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips (2004) make a distinction 
between exiting and new partners. I argue that all new partners are not the same because 
the social mechanism available with a new close partner would be different from the 
social mechanism available with a new distant partner. The concept of network distance 
is theoretically significant since it explains the social mechanisms that are available 
between two firms and the characteristics of information flowing between the two firms 
like an overall network structure. If there is a mutual partner between two firms (i.e., 
close partner), relational risk is reduced (Coleman, 1988). The novelty of information 
coming from an unconnected partner (i.e., distant partner) is higher than that from a 
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connected partner (Burt, 1992). In the dissertation, I suggest that network distance 
matters in business strategy, and I investigate the antecedents and consequences of the 
notion of alliance partner network distance which has not been explored by previous 
work.   
Second, the investigation of alliance partner network distance is also expected to 
contribute to the network literature by joining the conversation about what drives changes 
in network structure. The concept of network distance is theoretically and 
methodologically significant and interesting, building on the network literature. A 
partner’s network distance is fundamental to its network evolution, as it is a critical driver 
of network changes and configurations (i.e., network density). Changes in a firm’s 
egocentric network may result from the network distance of a newly added tie. I attempt 
to fill the literature gap by examining an additional tie rather than the cumulative effect of 
ties. With the notion of partner network distance, which goes beyond the distinction 
between existing vs. new partners (Beckman, Haunschild & Phillips, 2004), I capture 
changes in the network density of firms. In such a context, distant partners make a firm’s 
network sparse, while close partners make a firm’s network dense. 
 Third, my dissertation adds a new perspective to the explanation for alliance 
partner selection – agency theory – while previous work examining the determinants for 
partner selection has mainly explored the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2012; Connelly, Miller, Devers, 2012), exploration-exploitation view 
(Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), social network view (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & Gulati, 2011), 
and the perspective of learning from performance feedback (Baum et al, 2005).  The 
perspectives that prior literature adopts to explain partner selection offer different 
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predictions about the choice between a proximate and distant partner, leaving room for a 
contribution by introducing a new explanation that relies on a distinct theoretical 
framework. Viewing alliance partner choice from an agency lens – arguing that the 
interests of managers and principals differ with respect to alliance partner choice – has 
the potential to suggest a fresh perspective and explanation for partner choice. Further, if 
agency problems can be shown to be important determinants of alliance partner choice, 
leaving them out may amount to a misspecification of alliance choice models and 
research.  
Finally, this dissertation builds on the literature on innovation by showing the 
effect of partner choice on innovation and by examining the various types of innovation 
in Essay 2. I attempt to reconcile the long theoretical debate between the benefits of 
structural holes (Burt, 1992) that a distant partner spans, and network closure (Coleman, 
1988) that an alliance with a close partner creates on various types of innovation. I 
contribute to the literature by examining an additional tie with a dynamic perspective, 
controlling for network structure and by showing that the trust of a close partner (that 
creates a network closure) is associated with innovation quantity, while the novel 
information of a distant partner (that spans a structural hole) is associated with 
exploratory innovation.  
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FIGURE 1-1: The Theoretical Framework of the Study  
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 Chapter 2 Determinants of Alliance Partner Choice: Alliance 
Partner Network Distance and Agency Theory  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Alliance partner selection has been a major topic of interest in the strategy literature 
because partner selection is a critical decision for a firm (Beckman, Haunschild, & 
Phillips, 2004; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). To 
understand the determinants of partner selection decisions, prior literature has applied 
various lenses including the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 
2012; Connelly, Miller, & Devers, 2012), exploration-exploitation view (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006), social network view (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & Gulati, 2011), and the 
perspective of learning from performance feedback (Baum et al., 2005). However, the 
agency perspective is missing in the previous literature on alliance partner choice. It has 
implicitly assumed that the firm making the alliance partner choice is a unitary actor, or 
that the firm making alliance partner choice decisions has a single, unified utility function.  
Recognizing that the firm’s managers might have preferences that deviate from those of 
the firm’s owners when it comes to making the risky decisions involved in alliance 
partner choice is the foundational thesis of this study.  
Our point of departure is that embedded ties, such as past or close partners, imply 
lower risk (Walker, Kogut, & Shane, 1997; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Li & Rowley, 
2002). The risk involved in acquiring new alliance partners, sometimes labeled 
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“relational risk” (Das & Teng, 1998), derives from concerns about vulnerability, 
relationship imbalance, competition, value appropriation, and both the complexity and 
cost of monitoring (Park & Ungson, 2001; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). 
Prior literature suggests that social mechanisms between embedded ties help firms lower 
relational risk. Embedded ties provide greater access to information about potential 
exchange partners through shared third parties or previous direct ties, and reduce the 
costs and risks of searching for and screening potential partners and establishing new ties 
(Stuart, 1998). If agency concerns also prevail in making alliance partner choices with 
regard to relational risk, such as in other strategic decisions, then mechanisms that 
mitigate agency behavior in this setting are of considerable interest to both scholars and 
firms. More specifically, reducing relational risk implies a preference for embedded or 
close alliance partners over distant partners. Accordingly, agency mitigating mechanisms 
should reduce the proclivity of managers in agency-fraught firms to prefer close alliance 
partners over distant ones. 
To answer the question of which partner a firm chooses in an alliance context 
between embedded and nonlocal ties, we introduce the concept of alliance partner 
network distance. The network distance between a focal firm and its new partner is an 
alternative minimum path length (geodesic) toward the partner from the focal firm; 
therefore, close partners are connected through a mutual partner with the focal firm. In 
other words, a close partner is the focal firm’s partner’s partner. Conversely, there is no 
mutual partner between the focal firm and a distant partner. Network distance captures 
the social mechanisms available between two firms and the characteristics of information 
flowing between the two firms. Essentially, if there is a mutual partner between the two 
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firms (i.e., a close partner) we suggest that relational risk is reduced, as we explain in 
more detail later (Coleman, 1988). At the same time, distant partners are valuable 
because the novelty and diversity of information coming from them is well established as 
being higher than that from close, connected partners (Burt, 1992). Thus, the decision 
regarding alliance partner distance choice represents something of a tradeoff: higher 
relational risk, but also greater information value. 
We frame alliance partner network distance from the perspective of risk-related 
behavior and suggest that there exists a difference in views on alliance risk between the 
agent and the principal, the genesis of the agency problem. From the perspective of 
agent-managers, alliances with distant partners are riskier than those with close partners, 
and so managerially dominated firms tend to avoid alliances with distant partners. Firms 
that ally with distant partners are more exposed to the partner’s opportunism, potentially 
leading to alliance failure. Relational protections available to close partners are lost, and 
the possibility of gaining information about and experience with potential partners’ 
capabilities, conduct, and reliability are limited when firms ally with distant partners 
(Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Li & Rowley, 2002). Therefore, 
managers who are concerned about alliance failure tend to avoid distant partners in order 
to secure their own employment and compensation. However, distant partners also have 
benefits, such as access to non-redundant information (Burt, 1992; Vassolo, Anand, & 
Folta, 2004) and solutions to myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993), particularly from the 
perspective of the principal, who is risk neutral. 
Our research questions focus on whether principals and agents view alliance-
related risk differently from each other, and whether managerial self-serving behavior – 
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agency behavior – is a significant concern in the context of an alliance partner choice. To 
answer these questions, we investigate whether and how corporate governance 
mechanisms that mitigate agency problems affect alliance partner choice. We examine 
two different mechanisms: managerial incentives and board monitoring. Our central 
thesis is that when strong governance to address agency problems successfully aligns the 
interests of managers with those of the firm’s principals, top managers, who are typically 
risk-averse by nature, are likely to take greater risks in alliance partner choice and thus 
form alliances with distant partners. 
In addition to examining the extent to which strong corporate governance 
contributes to alliance partner network distance, we consider how managerial tenure 
moderates the influence of managerial stock ownership and outside directors’ stock 
ownership on alliance partner network distance because research suggests that managerial 
risk-taking behaviors are influenced by tenure (Sanders, 2001; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, 
Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008). Our results show that strong governance leads longer-tenured 
managers, who are typically risk averse, to take on greater risk by aligning the interests of 
executives with a long-term perspective.   
Our research contributes to the literature on partner selection decisions. While 
prior literature on partner choice has adopted various perspectives, including the 
relational view (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Connelly, Miller, Devers, 2012), the social 
network literature (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, Gulati, 2011), the exploration-exploitation 
literature (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) or learning from performance feedback (Baum et 
al., 2005), none of the prior work has adopted agency theory to examine partner selection 
decisions. The perspectives that prior literature adopts to explain partner selection offer 
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different predictions about the choice between a proximate and distant partner, leaving 
room for a contribution by introducing a new explanation that relies on a distinct 
theoretical framework. Viewing alliance partner choice from an agency lens which argues 
that the interests of managers and principals differ with respect to alliance partner choice 
has the potential to suggest a fresh perspective and explanation for partner choice. Further, 
if agency problems can be shown to be important determinants of alliance partner choice, 
leaving them out may amount to a misspecification of alliance choice models and 
research.  
Extensive research exists concerning the extent to which agency problems affect 
corporate strategies, such as acquisitions (Amihud & Lev, 1981), diversification (Denis, 
Denis, & Sarin, 1997), internationalization (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006), entry modes 
(Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009), and R&D investments (Kor, 2006; Chrisman & 
Patel, 2011; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008). It is appropriate to link agency problems with 
alliance contexts because top management teams (TMT) are involved in alliance 
formation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee & Park, 2008; Dickson & Weaver, 
1997) just as they are in acquisitions, divestitures, and other forms of investments. TMT 
members often conceptualize alliance strategies and key sources to provide a set of 
potential alliance partners. TMT members also indirectly influence alliance formation by 
building organizational structures, processes, and cultures, but the actual implementations 
of alliances may be conducted at the operating manager level. 
We test our ideas with 310 alliances of firms from the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries between 1992 and 2010. Prior literature in strategy has 
frequently used these industries as the context to test their hypotheses for M&As (Danzon, 
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Epstein, & Nicholson, 2007), R&D investments (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), and alliance 
partner choice (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). We build on the literature by testing 
agency problems in alliance partner decisions using the same context. We deal with 
possible endogeneity from issues of selection using a Heckman correction by using the 
geographic alliance formation propensity as an instrument for the firm’s decision to 
undertake an alliance when examining its choice of alliance partner, and subsequently 
incorporating the inverse Mills ratio in the second stage of the model.  
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this review of prior literature, I summarize the key concepts and findings from two 
bodies of work that are relevant to this research: alliance partner choice and alliance 
partner network distance. For each body of research, I summarize the primary theories, 
relevant empirical findings, and literature gaps that this dissertation attempts to address.  
 
2.2.1 Alliance Partner Choice  
Risk related to partners or relationships is considered one of the most important factors 
when making a partner decision. At an early stage of a relationship, the lack (or 
insufficiency) of partner information and intention emerges as an issue. During the 
relationship, vulnerable relationships, imbalance, competition, and complexity in 
monitoring behaviors (Park & Ungson, 2001) increase the relational risk in alliances. 
Value appropriation in alliances is also viewed as a major risk in these relationships 
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(Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). Thus, the mechanisms to mitigate relational 
risks are of interest to firms. Prior literature suggests that the social mechanism between 
embedded ties helps firms avoid being opportunistic with each other. Access to 
information about potential exchange partners through shared third parties or previous 
direct ties reduces the costs of establishing new ties and searching for and screening 
potential partners (Ellis, 2000; Stuart, 1998). Thus, the risk and uncertainty-reduction 
partnering logic predicts that organizational decision-makers will prefer embedded ties 
such as past partners and close partners (Walker, Kogut, & Shane, 1997; Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Li & Rowley, 2002).  
Interorganizational networks, however, commonly exhibit both local clustering 
and nonlocal ties that cut across the clusters (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Kogut & 
Walker, 2001; Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003). There have been efforts to explain the 
risky decisions of alliances with nonlocal ties. The controllability of uncertainty 
(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004), technology discontinuity (Rosenkopf & Padula, 
2008), existing network structure (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & Gulati, 2011) and performance 
relative to aspiration (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005) have been explored as 
determinants of partnering with non-embedded partners which is considered a risky 
decision.  
A gap in the literature on the determinants of risky alliance partner choice is that 
it ignores the chance of managerial opportunism, which may lead to suboptimal results, 
viewing a firm as an entity where the interests of the firm’s stakeholders are aligned 
when it comes to the alliance partner choice. The factors related to managerial 
opportunism that may affect the risk of partner choice have not yet been explored. The 
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interests involved in alliance formation vary within a firm. For example, the interests of 
the firm’s owners (shareholders) concerning the alliance may not be aligned with those of 
the agent manager, according to agency theory.  
Linking agency theory with alliance partner choice is theoretically relevant and 
significant. First, many of the motives and payoffs associated with acquisitions, 
diversification, and internationalization can also apply to partner choice. However, the 
unique features of a collaborative relationship, such as an alliance, also raise the question 
of whether the predictions of the theory extend to alliance contexts. Second, the literature 
on alliance highlights various benefits that firms achieve through alliances. Agency 
theory, nevertheless, may raise the possibility that adverse managerial motives may 
partially account for alliance outcomes, so the theory offers a distinct and contrarian 
perspective on alliances (Reuer & Miller, 1997). An agency theory view of firms’ 
investments in alliances offers a revisionist perspective on these benefits of alliances, and 
cautions that alliance investments may be ambiguous and in the interests of shareholders, 
as the literature often implies (Park & Ungson, 2001). An alliance partner choice may be 
accounted for by incentive misalignment due to the separation of ownership and control 
in firms. Finally, given that top managers are involved in an alliance partner choice 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lee & Park, 2008; Dickson & Weaver, 1997), as their 
responsibilities include decisions about acquisitions and R&D strategies, it is significant 
to examine how agent managers take advantage of alliance partner choices, and how 
agency hazards affect agent managers’ decisions in alliance contexts.  
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2.2.2 Alliance Partner Network Distance 
Prior literature on exploratory alliance behavior has explored different types of non-
embedded partners: new versus existing partners (Beckman et al., 2004; Rosenkopf & 
Padula, 2008), and local versus nonlocal ties (Baum et al., 2005). However, as a literature 
gap, these types of categories do not capture changes in the network structure after the tie 
formation and the underlying network structure between a focal firm and its partner. To 
fill the literature gap on partner choice, this paper extends the notion of nonlocal ties by 
adding the network distance of new partners, which captures the extent to which a partner 
is separated from the focal firm by the path length beyond the distinction between an 
existing partner and a new partner (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). Put another 
way, our approach explains whether a new tie formation is close or distant rather than 
explaining the overall pattern of local or non-local ties or the choice between a new tie 
and an existing tie. Further, in this study we capture nonlocal partners with partner 
network distance, which measures the extent to which a partner is separated from the 
focal firm by the path length.  
We posit that an alliance with a distant partner is a risk-taking behavior, and an 
alliance with a close partner is a risk-averse behavior, which are consistent with Baum, 
Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang (2005), Li and Rowley (2002) and Gulati and Gargiulo 
(1999). Specifically, Baum, Rowley, Shipilov and Chuang (2005: 536) suggest that 
engaging past partners in “repeated ties” and “forming new ties with partners’ partners” 
reduces uncertainty and risk in their exchanges. 
Specifically, trustworthiness and collective mechanisms available with a close 
partner decrease the likelihood of excessive appropriation and opportunism by partners. 
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Common ties promote good behavior by facilitating the information flow to enable the 
collective monitoring and sanctioning of deviant behavior among partners, which fosters 
concern about their reputations (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). When two firms share a 
common partner, it signals that both are regarded as trustworthy by the third party. The 
sanction mechanism and trustworthiness deter appropriation, and conflicts of interest can 
be resolved more easily (Coleman, 1990). In addition, third-party endorsements offer 
significant savings in the time and resources needed to identify potential partners and 
build new relationships, since a common third party also provides reliable information 
about each other (Podolny, 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  
In contrast, compared to close partners, an alliance with a distant partner, which 
lacks these social mechanisms, is risky and uncertain (Katila, Rosenburger, & Eisenhardt, 
2008). The lack of social capital in the relationship with a distant partner can result in risk, 
that is, a possible loss from relational failure. It is harder to evaluate and control distant 
partners than close ones. With a distant partner, all of the benefits and protections 
afforded to close ties are lost, and the possibility of gaining information about and 
experience with potential partners’ capabilities, conduct, and reliability are limited.  
Despite the relational risks of distant partners, there are benefits from the 
perspective of corporate interests. The vast majority of literature asserts that distant 
partners, through whom the focal firm spans structural holes, are better able to access 
novel information and resources from remote parts of the network (Burt, 1992). 
Furthermore, they allow the focal firm to hear about potential threats and opportunities 
more quickly than firms that are not so positioned (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). 
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Therefore, alliances with distant partners help firms overcome their myopia of learning 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). 
 Local searches are also known as a behavior in terms of searching for a solution 
in the related domain of current knowledge or expertise (Stuart & Podolny, 1996). 
However, such a focus may cause firms to develop core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1995) 
or to fall into a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988). A search along different 
dimensions is the fundamental mechanism by which firms learn (March, 1991; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Vassolo et al, 2004). An alliance with a distant partner 
enriches the knowledge pool by adding a distinctive new variation, which may provide a 
sufficient set of choices to solve problems (March, 1991) and generate recombinatory 
potential (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001).   
 
2.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
2.3.1 Agency Problems in Alliance Partner Choice  
We posit that choices of a close alliance partner are plausible vehicles for managers to 
obtain private benefits at the expense of shareholders’ interests in a high-risk and high- 
return context. Managers tend to avoid downside risk and prefer risk-reducing corporate 
strategies. They have so much of their economic and human capital, as well as their 
reputations tied to their firms that they are relatively under-diversified and stand to lose a 
great deal, including their employment and compensation, if their firms experience 
corporate insolvency or financial distress or they leave their firms due to the non-tradable 
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nature of their social capital investments (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007). As a 
result, managers worry about downside losses when it comes to strategic decisions. These 
concerns prevent them from taking needed risks, even when these projects would have a 
positive net present value. With this logic of managers’ risk avoidance, managers are less 
likely to ally with distant partners because alliances with distant partners involve high 
risk, as discussed earlier.  
As opposed to the risks managers face and their overexertion, there are benefits of 
alliances with distant partners from the perspective of larger corporate and shareholder – 
principal – interests, such as access to novel knowledge, innovation, and new ideas. This 
misalignment of risk preferences between the principal and agent results in agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To address this agency problem, firms design various 
mechanisms in terms of managerial incentives and monitoring systems. As for the 
incentive mechanism, aligning the interests of the agent-managers and shareholders by 
awarding managers with long-term compensation (Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009) 
and equity-based incentives (Eisenmann, 2002) is meant to discourage managers’ risk 
aversion, thereby reducing agency costs. As for the monitoring mechanism, the board’s 
independence (Kroll, Walters, Wright, 2008), CEO duality (Kor, 2006), institutional 
investors or blockholders (Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009), and venture capitalist 
backing (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003) are charged with reducing agency costs by 
establishing internal corporate governance mechanisms to discipline the CEO’s risk 
behavior. In particular, board monitoring reduces agency costs by establishing internal 
corporate governance mechanisms to discipline the agency’s risk behaviors. Based on the 
manager’s opportunism with respect to the alliance partner choice, we develop 
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propositions that link corporate governance with a firm’s risk-taking in alliance partner 
choice. Below, we discuss precisely how partner choice is affected under two types of 
corporate governance conditions: incentives in terms of stock ownership by managers 
and board monitoring with incentives by non-executive directors.  
 
2.3.2 Managerial Incentives  
Managers’ preferences for making conservative strategic decisions can be attributed to 
managers’ tendency to hold an “undiversified interest” in the form of their own 
employment, so they are more averse to financial distress that may harm their income and 
employment. Therefore, without an appropriate incentive, their decisions will manifest 
themselves as risk-averse in nature. In contrast, significant ownership imposes market 
discipline on managers and motivates them to pursue shareholder value maximization 
more aggressively. Thus, one remedy to the agency problem is stock ownership by top 
managers because their wealth (a function of their equity ownership) is directly tied to 
long-term performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The work of several scholars 
provides strong support for the argument that equity ownership by executive managers 
results in risk-increasing strategic decisions (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Wright, Kroll, Ladao, 
& Vanness, 2002). Stock ownership has been found to be more effective at aligning 
management interests with those of the shareholders than other executive compensation 
tools such as stock options (Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002). We argue that the 
managerial ownership incentive motivates managers to employ a risk-enhancing strategy, 
so alliances with distant partners increase as the executive incentives converge with the 
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interests of shareholders and managers. Prior literature generally confirms that 
managerial ownership increases managerial risk-taking (e.g., Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006).  
In sum, increased insider ownership results in reduced agency costs as the 
interests of insiders are aligned with those of the shareholders in pursuing long-term firm 
value. A manager with a significant portion of the firm’s stock is likely to focus on 
maximizing long-term shareholder value and not be self-serving (e.g., opting for 
strategies that result in short-term gains and reduced employment risks). Extending this 
argument to partner choice, a manager with more equity ownership has greater incentives 
to take risks when it comes to partner choice and is more likely to ally with distant 
partners that have a less immediate payoff. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1: A greater proportion of top managers' stock ownership will 
increase the likelihood of alliance formation with distant partners by the focal 
firm.   
 
2.3.3 Monitoring by Outside Directors   
The board of directors is usually responsible for decision control, which involves 
monitoring and evaluating management decision-making and performance. Outside 
members on the board, in particular, are more likely to question decisions made by the 
CEO and other executives. On the other hand, insider-dominated boards imply 
problematic self-monitoring and weak monitoring of the top managers, since top 
managers are likely to be in a position to influence an inside director’s career 
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advancement within the firm (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). Thus, a high ratio of external board 
members, signifying the independence of the board of directors, is expected to lead to 
more vigilant monitoring for shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the degree to which the independence of the board can be an 
effective monitoring mechanism of top management has been the subject of continued 
debate. Recent research suggests that the independence of the board of directors alone 
does not indicate a board’s effectiveness at monitoring (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 
2010). Some view external board members as often co-opted by top management teams. 
By deliberately identifying or promoting directors with similar philosophies on strategy 
and administration, CEOs can enhance board support for their initiatives and decisions or 
minimize the risk of dissension (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). In addition, outside directors 
should be understood as self-interested agents who also have to be incentivized to align 
their interests with those of the shareholders (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2010).  
Nonexecutive directors with ownership may provide a particularly important 
strategic contribution because of their direct and regular involvement in formulating the 
firm’s mission and development strategy, steering a firm’s decision-making toward 
higher risk-taking (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Oswald & Jahera, 1991). Along with 
interest alignment, Hambrick and Jackson (2000) indicate that nonexecutive directors 
who share ownership increase their identification with the company, making them more 
vigilant in their oversight and more generous with their time and attention. For example, 
with an incentive to increase the risk level of the firm, outside directors might take an 
active role and provide the top management team with advice on additional strategic 
moves that could further increase the risk level of the firm. From the perspective of 
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alliance partner choice, we suggest that when nonexecutive directors own a higher 
amount of stock, they will promote the choice of riskier, distant alliance partners. 
Formally, 
 
Hypothesis 2:  A greater proportion of nonexecutive directors’ stock ownership 
will increase the likelihood of alliance formation with distant partners by the 
focal firm.  
 
We now proceed to argue that the effect of managerial incentives and outside 
board monitoring on alliance partner network distance does not occur in a vacuum. 
Situational contingencies may either strengthen or dilute the corporate governance effects 
on a risk-taking decision because contingencies may influence the framing of decisions 
and managerial evaluation of risk. We examine managerial tenure as a contingency 
variable because managerial tenure is closely linked to managerial perceived risk-bearing 
(Sanders, 2001; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008).    
 
2.3.4 Contingent Effects of Managerial Tenure   
Long-tenured top executives tend to be entrenched. According to the upper-echelons 
perspective, more managerial learning occurs during the first few years in the firm, and 
managers may commit to that with which they feel comfortable. Younger-tenured 
mangers are likely to take risks because they are compelled to produce outcomes and 
prove themselves as competent managers during their first few years. Furthermore, 
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younger tenured executives have less to lose so they tend to be more aggressive in 
building personal wealth (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2000). Managers who are 
relatively new to the firm may also lack legitimacy in the eyes of certain internal or 
external stakeholders so they may feel more pressure to produce new initiatives and 
directions (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 
2008; Kor, 2006). In contrast, when people are employed by a particular organization for 
a long time, they tend to develop organization-specific skills that are valuable to the 
organization but are much less so on the open market. Accordingly, longer-tenured 
executives may be less receptive to change and may increase perceived risk-bearing 
which will, in turn, increase loss aversion among insiders.  
 When long-tenured managers are associated with a passive decision-making 
approach and resistant to the firm’s strategy, the firm’s competitive position may be 
jeopardized in a high technology industry such as the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industries. Thus, firms build strong governance to prompt even long-
tenured managers to take greater risks by allying with distant partners. When a strong 
managerial incentive and board monitoring are enforced, top managers may make an 
effort to escape the status quo. Their income is aligned with long-term performance, 
which includes taking greater risks. In addition, we suggest that the typical employment 
vulnerability of younger tenured executives also influences risk-bearing. Vulnerability is 
likely to exert a discounting effect on prospective wealth by lowering the probability of 
realizing the future wealth that is linked to a focal firm. With less wealth to gain out of 
stock ownership due to employment risk, executives should have less incentive to take 
risks in pursuit of this wealth. Thus,  
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Hypothesis 3a: Managerial tenure positively moderates the positive relationship 
between managers' stock ownership and alliance partner network distance, such 
that managerial tenure strengthens the relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Managerial tenure positively moderates the positive relationship 
between nonexecutive directors' stock ownership and alliance partner network 
distance, such that managerial tenure strengthens the relationship.  
 
2.4 METHODS 
2.4.1 Sample and Data Sources 
We tested our hypotheses in the context of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries in the United States between 1996 and 2010. The sample was drawn from all 
U.S. firms in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries present in the Acquisitions 
and Alliances database of the Security Data Company (SDC) from 1996 to 2010. Prior 
strategy literature has frequently used these industries as the context to test their 
hypotheses for M&As (Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2007), R&D investments 
(McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), and alliance partner choice (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012).  
To construct the data, we went through several steps. First, we defined the sample 
firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Based on SIC codes, a total 
of 2,485 alliances (237 alliances from the biotechnology industry and 2,248 alliances 
from the pharmaceutical industry) of 544 firms (both public and private firms) were 
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observed during the sample period between 1996 and 2010. Second, starting with the 
sample firms, we pulled a comprehensive set of alliances of sample firms and of those 
firms’ partners and of the partners’ partners to construct the network.1 Finally, for the 
analysis, we limited the sample firms to public firms, whose financial data and 
information on corporate governance were available from Compustat and Risk Metrics. 
This procedure left us with 310 alliances of 48 public firms. Our unit of analysis is the 
dyadic tie of an alliance. 
We obtained alliance information from the Acquisitions and Alliances database of 
the SDC. We collected information on firms from Standard & Poor’s Compustat, 
managerial incentives and boards of directors from ExecuComp and Risk Metrics, and 
innovation information from USPTO.  
 
2.4.2 Measures 
Dependent variables. The dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating whether 
a sample company chose among existing partners, new distant partners, or new close 
partners. The distance between a focal firm and its new partner was measured by an 
alternative minimum path length (geodesic) to the partner from the focal firm (Podolny, 
1994; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Shilling & Phelps, 2007). To compute the partner 
network distance, we extended the focal firm’s ego network to two degrees, (i.e., 
including the alliance partners of the focal firms’ partners). Unfortunately, the 
                                                          
1
 We added alliances that occurred up to four years prior to the sample years to control for possible left-
censoring problems. 
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termination dates of alliances are unclear since firms typically do not declare their 
termination dates.
2
 As a remedy for the lack of alliance termination dates, prior literature 
has used a moving window to construct the network structures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996). Consistent with this, we used a four-year moving 
window to account for the duration of each alliance. For example, when an alliance was 
formed in 1998, the alliance appears in our data until 2002. Thus, the adjacency matrix 
for a given year records alliances formed in that year and in any of the previous three 
years. We assigned 1 to each alliance if firms i and j entered into an alliance in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
Methodologically, partner network distance is captured by the shortest alternative 
path to a partner firm at the time period prior to alliance formation. For example, if the 
focal firm could reach its partner C through firm A (indicating that there was a mutual 
partner A between the focal firm and its partner C), the distance of partner C is 2, as 
Figure 2-1 illustrates. If the focal firm could reach its partner F through three firms, B, D, 
and E, then the shortest alternative path (before a direct relationship between the focal 
firm and its partner F was formed), and the distance is 4.
3
 
Figure 2-2 shows examples of a network distant partner and a network close 
partner. As an example of a network distant partner, Regulus is a distant partner of Glaxo 
Smith Klein, a focal firm in my sample, since Glaxo Smith Klein and Regulus do not share 
a mutual alliance partner. An example of a close partner is Top Meadow Farms, a close 
                                                          
2 
The SDC usually does not provide a termination date. A total of 1,823 termination dates are reported out 
of 127,523 alliances from 1990 to 2010, which is approximately 1.4% of the total alliance observations, 
according to our calculation. 
3
 Note that we treated the cases where there was no firm in between as infinite distance, meaning that the 
partner was an infinitely distant partner of distance 6, while the very first alliance partner for firms was 
treated as 0. As the definition implies, there is no common partner. 
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partner of ProMetic BioSciences Ltd., a focal firm in my sample, since they share a 
mutual partner, ProMetic Science. 
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FIGURE 2-1: Illustration of Alliance Partner Network Distance  
FIGURE 2-2: Examples of Alliance Partner Network Distance  
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We employed three categories to capture the network distance for the dependent 
variable as proxies for an existing partner, a new close partner, and a new distant partner. 
We categorized existing partners as 1 when the alliance partners was already in the 
alliance portfolio at the alliance formation
4
; new close partners as 2 when the distance of 
new partners is distance 2 (i.e., there is a mutual partner between the focal firm and the 
new partner); and new distant partners as 3 when the distance of new partners is 3 and 
beyond (i.e., there is no mutual partner between the focal firm and the new partner). 
 
Explanatory variables. To capture managerial incentives, Top managers' stock ownership 
for Hypothesis 1 was measured as the percentage of the equity holdings of inside 
directors to the total outstanding common shares of the company (Hoskisson et al., 2002; 
Beatty & Zajac, 1994). For board monitoring, Nonexecutive directors’ stock ownership 
for Hypothesis 2 was measured as the ratio of shares held by all nonexecutive directors to 
the total number of outstanding shares. We coded directors as “insider,” “affiliated – 
family or former employee,” “affiliated – professional relationship with firm” (coded as 0) 
or “outsider” (coded as 1). Hypothesis 3 postulates a moderating role of Managerial 
tenure, which was operationalized as the average tenure of executives. Tenure was the 
number of years that an individual had served as an executive of her or his present 
company.  
 
                                                          
4
 We excluded past partners that were no longer in the alliance portfolio from existing partners and 
considered them as new partners.  
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Control variables. Based on the past literature on alliance partner choice (Beckman et al., 
2004; Baum et al., 2005), we controlled for several alliance-, network-, and firm-related 
factors associated with alliance partner choice. First, we included alliance-level controls 
such as an Alliance purpose dummy, which may indicate function distance (e.g., R&D 
coded as 1; otherwise as 0), Alliance governance dummy (joint venture coded as 1; 
otherwise as 0), Cross-border dummy (cross-border coded as 1; otherwise as 0), 
Technological distance, which indicated the extent to which partner firms patented in 
distinctive technology classes based on the class and subclass within the U.S. patent 
classification system with a four-year window. It was measured by a reverse ratio of the 
common technological domain with partners divided by the number of total technological 
classes of the focal firm (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). Geographical distance, which indicated 
the extent to which the cost of knowledge transfer increases and the frequency of 
personal contact that builds social relations decreases, was measured by miles based on 
the zip codes of their headquarters (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003).  
Second, our study controlled for several network-related factors. We controlled 
for the Size of alliances, which was measured by the number of partners of alliances 
formed at time t. We controlled for Network size, measured by the number of partners of 
an alliance prior to time t. We assessed the presence or absence of Structural holes in the 
network of the focal firms and constructed structural holes as constraints using UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). We calculated the structural holes as one minus the 
firm’s constraint score (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). The Average clustering coefficient is 
measured as the number of actual links connecting all neighbors of a focal firm with one 
another, divided by the number of all possible ties among those nodes to distinguish 
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small world networks from random networks  to control for an alternative of network 
distance (Gulati, Sytch, & Tatarynowicz, 2012; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
Finally, at the firm level, we controlled for Board size, measured by the total 
number of board members and Board independence, measured by the ratio of external 
directors to the board size. Debt ratio was measured by the long-term debt of total assets. 
R&D intensity was measured by in process R&D expenses/sales. We controlled for Firm 
size, measured by the assets in logged format. To control for any relationship between 
Past performance and alliance propensity, partner choice and partner distance, we used 
the prior ROA, measured as the ratio of net income to the year-end value of total assets as 
a control variable in testing all hypotheses. Managerial age was the average age of all 
executives. Together with managerial tenure, managerial age measured the perceived risk. 
Table 2-1 summarizes variable operationalization.  
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TABLE 2-1: Variable Operationalization  
Variable Type Operationalization 
Data 
Source 
Partner 
Distance 
Category 
Alternative minimum path length toward the partner from the focal firm 
at time t-1 
Average value of distances of each alliance at time t 
Derived 
from SDC 
Managerial 
Ownership 
 
Continuous 
Ratio of the equity holdings of inside directors to the total outstanding 
common shares of the company owned by the top managers 
RiskMetrics 
Nonexecutive 
Ownership 
Continuous 
Ratio of the equity holding of outside directors to total outstanding 
common shares of the company 
RiskMetrics 
Managerial 
Tenure 
Continuous  The average of tenure of executives  RiskMetrics 
Alliance 
Purpose 
Dummy R&D alliance: 1; non R&D alliance: 0 
Derived 
from SDC 
Alliance 
Governance 
Dummy Joint venture: 1; non-joint venture: 0 
Derived 
from SDC 
Cross-border 
Alliance 
Dummy Cross-border alliance: 1; non cross-border: 0 
Derived 
from SDC 
Technological 
Distance  
Continuous  
Reverse ratio of the common technological domain with partners, 
divided by the number of total technological classes of the focal firm 
USPTO 
Geographical  
Distance  
Continuous Miles based on the zip codes of their headquarters 
Derived 
from SDC 
Alliance Size Continuous Number of partners of alliances formed at time t 
Derived 
from SDC 
Network Size Continuous Number of partners of alliances prior to time t 
Derived 
from SDC 
Structural  
Holes  
Continuous 1 - the firm’s constraint score 
Derived 
from SDC 
Clustering  
Coefficient  
Continuous 
Number of actual links connecting all neighbors of a focal firm with 
one another, divided by the number of all possible ties among those 
nodes 
Derived 
from SDC 
Board Size Continuous Number of board members 
COMPUST
AT 
RiskMetrics 
Board 
Independence 
Continuous  Ratio of external directors to the board size  RiskMetrics 
Debt Ratio Continuous Long-term debt divided by total assets 
COMPUST
AT 
R&D Intensity Continuous In-process R&D expenses divided by sales 
COMPUST
AT 
Firm Size Continuous Number of employees of the focal firm at time t 
COMPUST
AT 
Past 
Performance 
Continuous ROA at t-1 
COMPUST
AT 
Managerial 
Age 
Continuous The average age of executives  RiskMetrics 
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2.4.3 Model Specification 
To predict alliance partner distance, we needed to correct for possible selection effects 
because firms self-select when they form an alliance. Firms that form alliances are likely 
to be systematically different from those that do not. Thus, we used Lee’s (1983) 
generalization of the Heckman selection model to create a selection variable to control 
for alliance formation propensity in our multinomial logistic regression models.  
We used the number of alliances of firms located in the same geographic area as 
the focal firm’s headquarters as an instrumental variable (No. of alliances in the focal 
firm’s state). The logic is that firms are likely to form an alliance when firms in the same 
geographic area form more alliances. We entered this instrumental variable into the first-
stage probit regression to predict alliance formation propensity with the instrumental 
variable and a set of covariates that capture corporate governance (e.g., internal 
ownership and nonexecutive director ownership). This approach provides control 
variables referred to as the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), which was then entered into the 
second-stage network distance regression model (Heckman, 1979). We also checked to 
ensure that the instrumental variable was non-significant in the second stage. We 
clustered the data by firms in this step of analysis to take into account the non-
independence of observations from firms with multiple alliances. 
The second-stage regression involved running multinomial logistic models 
because partner network distance is a categorical variable. According to Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, the model for the relationship between corporate governance, the factors 
designed to resolve agency hazards, and partner choice for can be specified as follows: 
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115432110    itititititit PerfFirmNTWKAllianceCorpGovy , 
where yit denotes the partner distance of firm i toward its partner at time t; CorpGovit-1 
represents the factors of corporate governance, managerial ownership, and nonexecutive 
ownership that firm i has at time t-1; Allianceit  indicates the alliance objective, joint-
venture, cross-border, technological distance, and geographical distance with the partner 
of firm i at time t; NTWK it  indicates the alliance size, network size, structural hole, and 
clustering coefficient; Firm it indicates the focal firm’s board size, board independence, 
debt ratio, R&D intensity, firm size, prior innovation, managerial tenure, and managerial 
age; and Perfit-1 is the performance of firm i at time t-1. When the hypothesized 
moderators are included for Hypothesis 3, the model becomes: 
11654312110    itititititititit PerfFirmNTWKAllianceTenureCorpGovCorpGovy   
, where Tenure it denotes the managerial tenure.   
 
2.5 RESULTS 
Table 2-2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all key variables. The 
correlations are low, so multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue. Sample firms from the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries tend to form 5.7 alliances per firm, on 
average. There are 274 new distant partners (coded as 0), 23 new close partner (coded as 
1), and 13 existing partner (coded as 2) in the sample.  Given that new distant partners are 
the majority of observation, “new distant partners” is the reference category for this study.    
 
38 
 
TABLE 2-2: Descriptive Statistics (N=310)  
Variables Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. Partner Distance 2.87 .45 1 3 1.00                      
2. Managerial 
Ownership 
.03 .06 0 .40 0.11 1.00                     
3.Nonexecutive 
Ownership 
.01 .02 0 .16 0.09 0.15 1.00                    
4 Alliance 
Objective 
.25 .44 0 1 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 1.00                   
5. Alliance 
Governance 
.09 .28 0 1 -0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.06 1.00                  
6. Cross-border 
Alliance 
.08 .27 0 1 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 1.00                 
7. Technological  
Distance 
.96 .12 0 1 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.02 1.00                
8. Geographical  
Distance  
1687.09 1376.95 0 16593.71 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.11 1.00               
9. Alliance Size 1.18 .70 1 8 -0.09 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.17 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 1.00              
10. Network Size 8.85 12.25 0 64 -0.31 -0.36 -0.24 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 1.00             
11. Structural 
Holes 
.27 .33 0 1.13 0.17 0.45 0.21 0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.10 -0.51 1.00            
12. Clustering  
Coefficient  
.03 .11 0 1 0.05 0.24 0.32 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.16 0.14 1.00           
13. Board Size 10.50 2.70 5 19 -0.18 -0.35 -0.25 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.10 0.52 -0.38 -0.11 1.00          
14. Board 
Independence 
.68 .17 .15 1 0.01 -0.44 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.16 -0.06 0.11 1.00         
15. Debt Ratio .15 .32 0 8.58 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.18 0.17 0.06 -0.30 -0.03 1.00        
16. R&D Intensity -.48 11.38 -494.14 0 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.16 -0.18 -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 1.00       
17. Firm size 6.05 2.93 -2.58 12.27 -0.16 -0.46 -0.39 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.59 -0.39 -0.18 0.78 0.31 -0.22 0.04 1.00      
18. Prior 
Performance  
-.32 1.52 -34.44 .66 -0.13 -0.14 -0.33 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.37 -0.21 -0.24 0.44 0.19 -0.25 0.05 0.53 1.00     
19. Prior 
Innovation  
2.05 3.62   0 42.08 -0.18 -0.24 0.03 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.56 -0.28 -0.17 0.30 0.09 -0.14 0.05 0.20 0.12 1.00    
20. Managerial 
Tenure  
8.22 3.09 1.44 26.17 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.12 0.19 -0.04 1.00   
21. Managerial 
Age 
60.50 3.68 47.89 71.2 0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.06 -0.18 0.11 -0.05 0.21 0.21 -0.08 -0.00 0.25 0.32 -0.19 0.50 1.00  
22. Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
.69 .35 .12 1.55 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.13 -0.08 -0.54 0.35 0.08 -0.80 -0.12 0.37 0.09 -0.87 -0.45 -0.20 -0.08 -0.29 1.00 
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The first-stage probit results for alliance propensity indicate that when a firm is 
located in an area where other firms form many alliances, the firm is significantly more 
likely to form an alliance, as shown in Table 2-3.  
 
TABLE 2-3: The Effects of the Instrumental Variable on Alliance Propensity, 1996-
2010, Results of First-stage Probit Analysis 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
FIRM CONTROLS 
Board Size .06 
(.05) 
.06 
(.05) 
Debt Ratio -.42 
(.35) 
-.33 
(.33) 
R&D Intensity -.34† 
(.20) 
-.30 † 
(.18) 
Firm Size .30 ** 
(.09) 
.30*** 
(.09) 
Prior Performance -.34 
(.22) 
-.26 
(.21) 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONTROL 
Managerial Ownership .89 
(.90) 
.99 
(.95) 
Nonexecutive Ownership 4.90 
(3.25) 
4.89 
(3.05) 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
Number of Alliances in the State of the Focal 
Firm 
- .00 ** 
(.00) 
INTERCEPT -2.84*** 
(.55) 
-2.98*** 
(.57) 
Observations 334 334 
Groups 74 74 
Log Pseudo likelihood -206.86 -195.79 
Wald Chi-square Test for Overall Fit 40.09 50.94 
Pseudo R Squared 0.12 0.13 
 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p <.01  *** p <.001 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2-4 presents the results of the multinomial logit explaining the probability 
of a new close partner and an existing partner as compared to a new distant partner. Thus, 
a positive sign signifies a risk-averse behavior in alliance partner choice, that is, a higher 
probability of an alliance with an embedded tie (i.e., a new close partner or existing 
partner). Models 3-1 and 3-2 show only the control variables for new close partners and 
existing partners, respectively, with the baseline of new distant partners. Among the 
control variables, managerial tenure has a positive and significant effect on network 
distance across models, which is consistent with prior literature that suggests that longer-
tenured executives are less likely to take risks (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Kor, 2006). Interestingly, board size has a 
positive and significant effect on network distance. Prior literature has emphasized two 
different roles of the board. One stream of prior research focuses on the monitoring role 
of the board and suggests that larger boards tend to be more involved in monitoring 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Raheja, 2005). The other stream suggests that board directors 
provide advice to top managers as an external network. The result speaks to the advising 
role of directors, implying that a small board size leads to a tie with a distant partner to 
overcome a limited external network.   
When we include two mechanisms to address agency problems, we find a 
consistent strong effect of corporate governance on network distance. Model 4-1 
indicates that managerial ownership has a statistically significant negative effect on 
partner distance for new close partners, compared to new distant partners, in support of 
Hypothesis 1 (β=-31.70, p <.05). The result suggests that less managerial incentive leads 
to alliances with new close partners rather than with new distant partners. Thus, 
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managerial incentive as manifested by management stock ownership encourages 
managers to seek distant partners. While some prior research suggests a nonmonotonic 
(i.e., an inverted-U-shaped) effect of managerial ownership on managerial risks, our 
results show a linear relationship. While the coefficients of the multinomial logit model 
allow me to assess the sign and significance of the independent variables, they do not 
reflect the magnitude of their effect on the probability of an alliance with a distant partner 
because the slope of the cumulative probability curve changes depending on the values of 
other observations in the sample. Following previous practice, I instead interpret the 
effect magnitudes based on the average marginal effect (AME) of each predictable 
variable. The AME is obtained by calculating the marginal effect for each observation in 
the sample holding all other variables at their mean values and then averaging across all 
observations. The average marginal effect of executive ownership on probability of 
alliance with distant partner is 7.2 percent over with close partner. Specifically, 0.1% 
increase in executive ownership causes 9.4% increase in probability of alliance with 
distant partner from 89.5% to 98.9%. Another 0.1% increase in executive ownership 
causes 0.3% increase in probability of alliance with distant partner from 99.5% to 99.8%.          
As predicted in Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for nonexecutive directors’ stock 
ownership is negative and significant on partner distance for new close partners, 
compared to new distant partners in Model 4-1 in Table 2-4 (β=-127.64, p < .05). The 
result suggests that less nonexecutive board directors’ stock ownership leads to alliances 
with new close partners rather than with new distant partners. Thus, the incentive to 
strengthen board monitoring mechanisms, specifically ownership by nonexecutive board 
directors, pushes managers to form alliances with distant partners. Interestingly, the result 
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indicating that the control variable of board independence is not associated with partner 
network distance suggests that board independence is not enough by itself for effective 
monitoring; stock owned by nonexecutive board members is needed to strengthen the 
board monitoring function. The average marginal effect of nonexecutive ownership on 
probability of alliance with distant partner is 29.5 percent over with close partner. 
Specifically, 0.04% increase in executive ownership from 0%, which is 20% change of 
nonexecutive ownership, causes 8.7% increase in probability of alliance with distant 
partner from 90.9% to 99.6%. Another 0.04% increase in nonexecutive ownership causes 
0.3% increase in probability of alliance with distant partner from 99.6% to 99.9%.   
The moderating effect of managerial tenure on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and alliance partner network distance is marginally significant in 
Model 5-1 (see Table 2-4), marginally supporting H3a (β=-8.92, p < .10). The result 
suggests that firms go for distant partners to a greater extent when managers are long-
tenured with strong managerial incentives.  
The moderating effect of managerial tenure on the relationship between 
nonexecutive directors’ stock ownership and alliance partner network distance was 
negative and significant in Model 5-1 as shown in Table 2-4 (β=-94.52, p < .05), 
supporting H3b. The result may imply that the effectiveness of board monitoring is 
affected by managerial tenure. We split the sample by managerial tenure into longer 
tenured managers above average of managerial tenure and younger-tenured managers 
below average of managerial tenure. The result suggests that firms are less like to ally 
with new close partners over new distant partners when both nonexecutive directors’ 
stock ownership and managerial tenure are high. Thus, firms seek distant partners to a 
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greater extent when managers are long-tenured with strong board monitoring. The AME 
is 30.2% for younger-tenured managers, and the AME is 33.2% for older-tenured 
managers. The average marginal effect of nonexecutive ownership on probability of 
alliance with distant partner is 30.2 percent over with close partner when managers are 
younger-tenured whereas the average marginal effect of executive ownership on 
probability of alliance with distant partner is 33.2 percent over with close partner when 
managers are older-tenured.  Older tenured managers are more likely to ally with distant 
partners than younger tenured managers who are under strong governance. Managerial 
tenure has a stronger negative effect on the probability of an alliance with a distant 
partner with low nonexecutive board monitoring than with high nonexecutive board 
monitoring.  To illustrate the complex interaction effect, we draw a graph using the two 
categories of longer-tenured managers and younger-tenured managers and the probability 
of choosing a new distant partner over a new close partner in the relationship with 
nonexecutive ownership, as illustrated in Figure 2-3.   
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FIGURE 2-3: Interaction between Nonexecutive Ownership and Managerial Tenure 
Predicting the Probability of a Distant Partner   
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TABLE 2-4: The Effects of Corporate Governance on Partner Network Distance, 
1996-2010, Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis  
 Model 3-1: 
New Close   
Model 3-2: 
Existing 
Model 4-1: 
New Close  
Model 4-2: 
Existing 
Model 5-1: 
New Close 
Model 5-2: 
Existing 
Alliance Objective 1.13 *  
(.48) 
.38 
(.62) 
1.11 *  
(.53)  
.36 
(.64) 
1.05 † 
(.58) 
.31 
(.61) 
Alliance Governance 
 
2.10 *** 
(.33) 
1.13 
(.83) 
2.14 *** 
(.37)  
1.06 
(.84) 
2.21 ***  
(.36) 
1.10 
(.87) 
Cross-border Alliance 
 
1.66 
(1.27) 
-14.50 *** 
(.50) 
1.79 
(1.27) 
-15.49 *** 
(.56) 
1.80 
(1.29) 
-15.39 *** 
(.55) 
Technological Distance   
 
-6.43** 
(1.91) 
-7.04 *** 
(1.89) 
-5.97 ** 
(1.97)  
-7.25 *** 
(1.83) 
-5.57 ** 
(2.07) 
-7.42 *** 
(2.04) 
Geographical Distance   
 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00  
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Alliance Size 
 
1.01** 
(.29) 
.10 
(.64) 
1.06 ***  
(.31) 
.10 
(.63) 
1.10 *** 
(.31) 
.07 
(.61) 
Network Size 
 
.05 
(.05) 
.05 
(.03) 
.07  
(.05)  
.04 
(.03) 
.06 
(.05) 
.04 
(.04) 
Structural Holes -10.88 ** 
(4.08) 
-14.21 * 
(6.62) 
-9.09 
(6.55) 
-17.39 † 
(9.00) 
-8.77 
(6.65) 
-17.73 † 
(9.90) 
Clustering Coefficient  
 
10.69 ** 
(3.92) 
-3.58 
(13.11) 
21.11 **  
(7.17) 
-2.12 
(13.73) 
21.65 * 
(8.40)  
-2.72 
(14.64) 
Board Size 
 
.32 * 
(.12) 
-.13 
(.17) 
.33 ** 
(.12) 
-.14 
(.18) 
.32 ** 
(.11) 
-.16 
(.18) 
Board Independence 
 
-3.42 
(2.79) 
.31 
(2.64) 
-2.47 
(3.85)  
1.33 
(3.03) 
-3.50 
(3.64)  
1.75 
(2.65) 
Debt Ratio 
 
-7.56 
(5.45) 
-1.19 
(1.31) 
-5.20 
(5.18) 
-.32 
(2.20) 
-4.51 
(4.03) 
-.06 
(2.07) 
R&D Intensity 13.08 
(10.06) 
1.76 
(2.70) 
6.81 
(4.16) 
2.23 
(3.16) 
8.29 * 
(3.50) 
2.26 
(2.96) 
Firm Size .05 
(.63) 
-.27 
(.63) 
-.78 
(.89) 
-.45 
(.89) 
-1.07 
(.71) 
-.55 
(.94) 
Prior Performance 
 
4.80 * 
(2.43) 
.46 
(3.68) 
6.07 * 
(2.68) 
-.20 
(4.27) 
6.98 * 
(2.81)  
-.02 
(4.21) 
Prior Innovation Quality  -.40 * 
(.17) 
.17 
(.24) 
-.50 * 
(.21)  
.20 
(.26) 
-.56 * 
(.22) 
.22 
(.30) 
Managerial Tenure .23 * 
(.11) 
-.24 * 
(.10) 
.24 † 
(.14) 
-.22 * 
(.11) 
.39 * 
(.17) 
-.20 
(.16) 
Managerial Age -.51 ** 
(.18) 
.22 
(.17) 
-.52 ** 
(.20)  
.22 
(.19) 
-.54 * 
(.21)  
.21 
(.17) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  .94 
(1.94) 
-.27 
(2.61) 
-1.35 
(2.72) 
-.98 
(2.96) 
-2.54  
(2.47) 
-1.72 
(3.25) 
Hypotheses Effects 
Managerial Ownership - - -31.70 * 
(13.89) 
7.58  
(7.86)  
2.48  
(1.58) 
-.12 
(1.33) 
Nonexecutive Directors’ Ownership - - -127.64 * 
(57.18)  
-86.30 
(109.66) 
3.08 † 
(1.66)  
2.23 * 
(.86) 
Managerial Ownership 
* Managerial Tenure 
- - - - -8.92 † 
(4.62)  
1.35 
(3.21) 
Nonexecutive Directors’ Ownership 
* Managerial Tenure  
- - - - -94.52 * 
(41.40)  
-40.35 
(28.07) 
Observations (Groups)  310 (48) 310 (48) 310 (48) 
Log pseudo likelihood -93.91 -92.86 -91.92 
Pseudo R squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 
 
The comparison baseline is “New Distant Partner.”  
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The partner industry dummy control is included.  
† p <.1 * p <.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001.   
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 2-5 presents a summary of the empirical findings of this study. Overall, the 
results of the empirical analyses provide strong support for the effects of strong corporate 
governance on managerial risk-taking in the context of alliance partner choice.    
 
TABLE 2-5: Summary of the Empirical Findings  
Hypothesis Prediction 
Coeff. 
Estimate 
Finding 
H1  A greater proportion of top managers' stock 
ownership will increase the likelihood of 
alliance formation with distant partners by the 
focal firm. 
31.70 Supported  
(p<.05)  
H2  A greater proportion of nonexecutive directors’ 
stock ownership will increase the likelihood of 
alliance formation with distant partners by the 
focal firm. 
127.64 Supported  
(p<.05) 
H3a  Managerial tenure positively moderates the 
positive relationship between managers' stock 
ownership and alliance partner network 
distance.  
8.92 Marginally 
Supported  
(p<.10) 
H3b  Managerial tenure positively moderates the 
positive relationship between nonexecutive 
directors' stock ownership and alliance partner 
network distance. 
94.52 Supported  
(p<.05) 
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2.5.1 Robustness Tests  
New distant partners were categorized as 3 when the distance was 3 and beyond, while 
the distances of new close partners and existing partners were categorized in the analyses 
as 2 and 1, respectively. However, one may argue that even partners of a distance of 3 
may be sharing social mechanisms such as peer pressure, so those partners could be 
regarded as new close partners. With an alternative measure of network distance that 
includes the distance of 3 as a new close partner, the results showed that the main effects 
of managerial incentive and outside board monitoring influence alliance partner network 
distance, which is consistent with the main story, although the interactions weakened 
somewhat.  
Another concern could be that partners appearing for the first time, categorized as 
distant partners, might have distinctive characteristics from distant partners that have 
partners other than the focal firm. As a robustness check, we performed supplementary 
analyses by adding a dummy variable to take into account first-time partners. Our results 
remained consistent.  
Some might argue that partner distance can be defined in terms of technological 
distance (e.g., the nature of resources), as well as social distance and that incentivized 
agency simply prefers technologically distant partners, regardless of the network distance. 
To address this concern, we controlled for technological distance in the analyses, and the 
results showed that managerial incentives and monitoring increase network distance, 
above and beyond technological distance.  
Beyond the control, we examined how technological distance interacts with 
network distance. We examined whether strong governance increases alliance partner 
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technological distance and whether firms choose a distant partner, both technologically 
and relationally, under strong governance. We found that even with the high level of 
relational risk of a distant partner, firms still choose technologically distant partners. As 
Model 6 in Table 2-6 indicates, managerial incentives increase alliance partner 
technological distance (β=47.75, p < .05). Consistent with network distance, we have 
confirmed that strong governance increases managerial risks, both technologically and 
relationally, in the alliance partner selection context.  
 In addition, we demonstrated that managerial incentive and board monitoring 
increase the probability of an alliance with a technologically distant partner, even when 
the partner is already relationally distant (See model 7 in Table 2-6 (β=18.31, p < .05, 
β=22.56, p < .10)). The results suggest that shareholders favor access to unexplored 
technology domains, as well as non-redundant information from distant partners. 
Alliances with partners of technological relatedness may increase the redundancy of ideas, 
skill sets, and knowledge, which leads to a sub-additive alliance portfolio (Vassolo et al., 
2004). In addition, the technological relatedness also increases the ability of partners to 
gain value from the focal firm. Greater technological relatedness provides the partner 
firm with the necessary absorptive capacity to assimilate the focal firm’s knowledge and 
identify the alternative properties of such knowledge beyond the current alliance (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Sampson, 2007). Our result implies that 
when two firms are not technologically similar (or technologically distant), the lack of 
social capital (or relationally distant) may not be a concern because of unlikely 
knowledge appropriation. We provide evidence that technological distance and network 
distance complement each other.  
49 
 
 Finally, we ran logistic regression in Model 8-1 through Model 9-2 as another set 
of robustness tests, as shown in Table 2-7. Model 8-1 and Model 8-2 present the 
influence of corporate governance and the moderating effect of managerial tenure on the 
comparison between new distant partners and new close partners with the exclusion of 
existing partners in the model. The results are generally similar to the multinomial logit 
results shown in Table 2-4. A high level of managerial ownership and nonexecutive 
ownership increase the probability of an alliance with a new distant partner over a new 
close partner, supporting Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 (β=33.43, p < .05, β=136.17, p 
< . 05). In addition, the result of the moderating effect of managerial tenure on the 
relationship between nonexecutive board stock ownership and network distance is 
consistent with the multinomial logit result in Table 2-4 in support of H3b (β=93.72, p 
< .05).  
However, the results of binary logistic analysis that compares new distant partners 
and embedded ties (both new close partners and existing partners) are not the same as the 
results of the multinomial logit in Table 2-4. The results in Model 9-1 suggest that the 
effect of corporate governance on network distance is not significant while the 
moderating effect of managerial tenure on the relationship between nonexecutive board 
stock ownership and network distance is positive and significant  (β=50.69, p < .01). 
Contrary to our expectation that the choice of existing partners may be more risk-averse 
than the choice of new close partners, the results imply that existing partners and new 
close partners are not identical in terms of partner-relational risks and benefits as we 
discussed above.       
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TABLE 2-6: The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Combined Effect of 
Network Distance and Technological Distance, 1996-2010  
 Model 6: 
Technological Distance 
Model 7: Combined Effect of 
Network Distance and 
Technological Distance 
 Generalized Linear Model Logit 
Alliance Objective .39 
(.51) 
.44 
(.33) 
Alliance Governance 
 
2.01 * 
(.90)  
1.60 
(1.06) 
Cross-border Alliance 
 
.72 
(.68)  
.80 
(.76) 
Network Distance   
 
.59 ***  
(.10)  
 - 
Geographical Distance   
 
.00 
( .00) 
.00 
( .00) 
Alliance Size 
 
-.58 † 
(.33)  
.08 
(.56)  
Network Size 
 
.02 
(.02)  
-.00 
(.01)  
Structural Holes .94  
(.87) 
2.08 ** 
(.64)  
Clustering Coefficient  
 
2.89  
(2.62) 
-.96 
(2.13) 
Board Size 
 
-.16  
(.13)  
.15 * 
(.08) 
Board Independence 
 
1.19 
(1.21)  
1.32 
(1.30)  
Debt Ratio 
 
-2.35 * 
(1.18)  
-2.89 ** 
(1.08)  
R&D Intensity .74 * 
(.31)  
.31 
(.40)  
Firm Size 1.08 * 
(.42)  
.58 † 
(.31) 
Prior Performance 
 
.56  
(1.02) 
-.73 
(1.44) 
Prior Innovation Quality  .15 
(.15)  
.04 
(.13)  
Managerial Tenure -.09 
(.08)  
.03 
(.06)  
Managerial Age .04 
(.06)  
.08 
(.05) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.91 * 
(.88)  
5.01 *** 
(1.36)   
Hypotheses Effects 
Managerial Ownership 47.75 * 
(19.10)  
18.31 * 
(7.98)  
Nonexecutive Directors’ Ownership 35.34  
(41.06)  
22.56 † 
(13.17)  
No. of Observations 310 274 
No. of Groups 48 48 
Log pseudo likelihood -22.66 -124.49 
Pseudo R squared 0.31 0.21 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001 Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The partner industry dummy control is included. The comparison baseline for Model 7 is “New Close Partner.”  
Note that Model 7 includes only alliances with network-distant partners.  
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TABLE 2-7: The Effects of Corporate Governance on Partner Network Distance, 
1996-2010, Results of Logistic Regression Analysis  
 Model 8-1: 
New Distant vs. 
New Close   
Model 8-2: 
New Distant vs. 
New Close  
Model 9-1: 
New Distant vs. New 
Close & Existing 
Model 9-2: 
New Distant vs. New 
Close & Existing 
Alliance Objective -.96 †   
(.54) 
-.91 
(.59) 
-.90 * 
(.37) 
-.86 * 
(.38) 
Alliance Governance 
 
-2.10 *** 
(.35) 
-2.16 *** 
(.33) 
-1.68 *** 
(.46) 
-1.71 *** 
(.47) 
Cross-border Alliance 
 
-1.73 
(1.32) 
-1.74 
(1.33) 
-.76 
(.76) 
-.83 
(.78) 
Technological Distance   
 
5.54 * 
(2.36) 
5.11 * 
(2.35)  
5.97 *** 
(1.49) 
5.73 *** 
(1.57)  
Geographical Distance   
 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Alliance Size 
 
-1.17 ** 
(.38) 
-1.22 ** 
(.39)  
-.63† 
(.37) 
-.61 † 
(.37) 
Network Size 
 
-.07 
(.04) 
-.07 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.03) 
Structural Holes 8.59 
(6.61) 
8.55 
(6.80) 
9.24 † 
(4.74) 
9.41 † 
(4.90)  
Clustering Coefficient  
 
-21.52 ** 
(7.53) 
-22.11 * 
(9.66) 
-7.09 * 
(2.92)  
-7.34 * 
(3.21) 
Board Size 
 
-.32 ** 
(.11) 
-.31 ** 
(.10) 
-.14 
(.10) 
-.12 
(.10) 
Board Independence 
 
1.82 
(4.18) 
3.01 
(3.91) 
.16 
(2.65) 
.20 
(2.61) 
Debt Ratio 
 
4.64 
(4.69) 
3.98 
(3.58) 
3.44 
(3.25) 
3.06 
(3.38) 
R&D Intensity -7.19 † 
(4.34) 
-8.87 * 
(3.71) 
-1.90 
(1.69) 
-2.14 
(1.71) 
Firm Size .93 
(.89) 
1.19 
(.73) 
.53 
(.72) 
.76 
(.72) 
Prior Performance 
 
-6.64 * 
(2.80) 
-7.62 * 
(3.01) 
-2.20 
(2.91) 
-2.51 
(2.91) 
Prior Innovation Quality  .53 * 
(.22) 
.60 * 
(.24) 
.12 
(.20) 
.11 
(.21) 
Managerial Tenure -.26 * 
(.13) 
-.42 ** 
(.16) 
-.02 
(.11) 
-.10 
(.12) 
Managerial Age .58 ** 
(.19) 
.59 ** 
(.20) 
.17 
(.19) 
.21 
(.20) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.91 
(2.80) 
2.92 
(2.57) 
.48 
(2.10) 
1.40 
(2.08) 
Hypotheses Effects 
Managerial Ownership 33.43 * 
(14.54) 
-46.72 
(29.42) 
.25 
(6.28) 
-6.08 
(11.65) 
Nonexecutive Directors’ Ownership 136.17 * 
(54.44) 
-189.18 † 
(106.91)  
82.62 (72.47) -108.07 * 
(48.21) 
Managerial Tenure * 
Managerial Ownership 
- 9.63 † 
(5.38) 
 1.02 
(1.53) 
Managerial Tenure * 
Nonexecutive Directors’ Ownership 
- 93.72 * 
(41.12) 
 50.69 ** 
(17.77) 
Observations (Groups)  297(45) 310(48) 
Log pseudo likelihood -50.24 -49.54 -78.64 -78.14 
Pseudo R squared 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.29 
 
The comparison baseline is “New Close Partner.”  
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The partner industry dummy control is included.   
† p <.1 * p <.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2.6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
We began by relaxing the assumption of a firm making partner choices as a unitary actor 
and positing that choosing distant alliance partners involves relational risk on the part of 
managers. Consequently, agency considerations apply to making this choice. We then 
examined how and under what circumstances agency costs regarding partner distance 
might be alleviated by the design of corporate governance. Our results provide support 
for the idea that firms seek distant partners when their corporate governance mechanisms 
successfully address agency problems and encourage the firms’ managers to take risks in 
their alliance partner choices. Firms tend to form alliances with distant partners when 
firms have a strong managerial incentive structure and board monitoring system, and 
more specifically, when top managers and nonexecutive directors have stock ownership. 
Our findings, therefore, support the idea that the agency problem may well extend to 
firms’ collaborative strategies (i.e., alliance partner choices).  
We contribute to the literature on partner choice by joining the conversation of 
what drives alliances with distant partners. Previous work has explored the controllability 
of uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004), technology discontinuities (Rosenkopf & Padula, 
2008), existing network structure (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & Gulati, 2011), resources and 
capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012), and performance relative to aspirations 
(Baum et al., 2005) as determinants of partnering with nonlocal firms. These alternative 
theories offer a different prediction, which leaves room for a contribution by introducing 
a new lens that relies on a distinct theoretical framework. That being said, to these 
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explanations we add corporate governance to mitigate the agency problem as a driver of 
alliance partner choice. In addition, prior literature is yet to begin a discussion of how 
managerial opportunism affects alliance partner choices. We show that firms’ decisions 
regarding alliance partners are sensitive to the presence of agency hazards arising from 
the separation of ownership and control; thus, managers may be opportunistic when it 
comes to alliance partner choices. More generally, prior studies view a firm as a unitary 
entity encompassing the interests of agents and principals when firms are involved in 
alliance partner choices. Previous literature on corporate strategy and finance has only 
examined agency theory in the context of acquisitions, diversification, and R&D 
investments. Our study is among the first to view the firm as an entity of fragmented 
interests when it comes to alliance partner choice between the agent and the principal. 
More specifically, we show that many of the agency motives and payoffs 
associated with acquisitions, diversification, and internationalization also apply to partner 
choice. The literature on alliances highlights various benefits that firms achieve through 
alliances. Agency theory, nevertheless, raises the possibility that adverse managerial 
motives may partially account for alliance choices, and eventually, the outcomes. 
Consequently, our use of agency theory offers a distinct perspective on alliances. In 
addition, there has been debate on the explanatory power of agency theory. For example, 
the assumption in agency theory that self-interest is a motive for managerial decisions is 
rejected by Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998, 1999). A test of whether agency 
problems have an impact in an alliance setting, as we perform here, contributes to 
exploring the boundary conditions of the theory by showing that self-interested managers 
might be making sub-optimal alliance partner choices.  
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We also extend prior literature by adding the notion of network distance of 
nonlocal ties relative to the prior literature, which only distinguishes between new and 
existing partners (Beckman et al., 2004). Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips (2004) make 
a distinction between exiting and new partners. We argue that all new partners are not the 
same because the social mechanism available with a new close partner would be different 
from the social mechanism available with a new distant partner. Theoretically, the notion 
of network distance explains the social mechanisms that are available between two firms 
and the characteristics of information flowing between the two firms. These social 
mechanisms are like an overall network structure. If there is a mutual partner between the 
two firms (i.e., close partner), the relational risk is reduced (Coleman, 1988), and the 
novelty of information coming from an unconnected partner (i.e., distant partner) is 
higher than that from a connected partner (Burt, 1992). The social mechanism and 
information novelty are associated with the risk that managers take; thus, the 
investigation of network distance is relevant to agency theory. 
Like all research, this study raises questions that remain unanswered. Future 
research could explore other aspects of corporate governance in exploring alliance 
partner choice, such as distinguishing between the behaviors of agent-managers vs. 
founder CEOs (Souder, Simsek, & Johnson, 2012). Further, while we examined the stock 
ownership of executives, we did not include TMT compensation (Dever et al., 2008; 
Beatty & Zajac, 1994) as a potential determinant of alliance partner choice; this too, 
might be an avenue for future research. 
Moreover, our study includes only the formal relationships of alliances when it 
comes to building a firm’s network, thus excluding informal relationships. Information 
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flows through information networks such as a TMT’s personal network, which also 
affects alliance partner decisions. Future research may benefit from adding informal 
along with formal networks. Potentially, interlocking boards between two firms (Gulati & 
Westphal, 1999) can be used as an information network. Such research would be helpful 
in understanding whether TMT networks or board interlocks substitute or complement a 
firm’s alliance networks. Finally, we are taking the first step to apply agency theory to 
alliance contexts; thus, our theory development relies on conventional agency theory. 
This focus provides research opportunities such as adding a behavioral agency model 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007; Devers, 
McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008). Consideration of behavioral views as to how 
individuals make choices in the context of incentives and monitoring has the potential to 
add complex nuances that remain undiscovered in prior agency-related research. 
Nevertheless, our work represents an initial step in conjoining agency theory with the 
alliance literature. 
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Chapter 3 How Does Alliance Partner Network Distance 
Affect a Firm's Innovation? 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In an effort to understand how relational risk and knowledge transfer challenges in an 
alliance affect a firm’s innovation, prior literature on alliances (or any dyadic relationship) 
and innovation has investigated the effects of overall alliance partner composition 
(Phelps, 2010), alliance network structures (i.e., local clustering; Schilling & Phelps, 
2007) and the strength of ties within a network (Tiwana, 2008; Hansen, 1999) as 
determinants of innovation.  
Although research has long recognized the importance of alliance partner choice 
in a firm’s innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Sampson, 2007; Phelps, 2010), previous research 
has yielded conflicting results about the influence of alliance partner choice on firm 
innovation between the benefits of novel and non-redundant information from an alliance 
partner and the benefits of social capital with an alliance partner. On one side of the 
debate, studies have found that novel information enhances knowledge creation 
(Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) because it provides actors with 
timely access to diverse information (Burt, 1992) from the partners and increases 
innovation. On the other side of the debate, research has suggested that social capital, 
including trust, reciprocity norms, and a shared identity, improves knowledge transfer 
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and innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Hansen, 
1999) because social capital increases cooperation and knowledge sharing (Coleman, 
1988; Portes, 1998).   
There are two reasons for the conflicting results about the benefits of novel 
information and social capital in a relationship with an alliance partner on innovation. 
First, it views an alliance only as a dyadic relationship. The network structure underlying 
in this dyadic relationship has not been taken into account. The network structure 
embedded in a dyadic relationship influences partner risk, knowledge transfer challenges, 
and information quality. If there is a mutual partner between two firms, relational risk is 
reduced (Coleman, 1988) and the novelty of information coming from unconnected 
partners is higher than that from connected partners (Burt, 1992). In the current research, 
the notion of network distance captures how two parties are connected to each other in a 
network configuration, along with the direct dyadic relationship. Thus, conceptually, 
close partners are likely to make a focal firm’s network denser by creating network 
closure, while distant partners construct sparse networks by creating a structural hole. By 
linking the literature on alliances with the literature on networks with the notion of 
alliance partner network distance, we can see how innovation is influenced differently by 
diverse and timely information from distant partners and by the social mechanisms that 
are available between close partners.   
Second, research on the relationship between network structure and innovation  
has only focused on a particular type of innovation, either innovation quantity (Ahuja, 
2000; Guler & Nerkar, 2012) or innovation characteristics (i.e., exploratory innovation by 
Phelps, 2010) to investigate the effect of alliance partner choice on innovation. Without 
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examining the comprehensive types of innovation together, we cannot conclude that one 
type of alliance partner  is beneficial to innovation and the other is not, since a particular 
type of innovation may require social capital of closure (Coleman, 1988) over novel 
knowledge of a structural hole (Burt, 1992) or novel knowledge over social capital.   
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of alliance partner network 
distance, which captures the network structure embedded in an alliance, on various types 
of innovation. I explore how knowledge coming from a distant (or close) partner 
contributes to a firm's innovation, and additionally, whether technological distance 
between a focal firm and its partner compensates for network distance. My research 
question is: How does alliance partner network distance affect innovation in terms of 
innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, and innovation quality?  
I contend that an alliance with a close partner, a relationship based on trust and 
similarity, encourages the firm to share information and knowledge. Open and frequent 
knowledge transfer leads to increased innovative output. Similarity with close partners 
allows easier interpretation of partner knowledge, producing quick innovative output. In 
contrast, non-redundant knowledge from distant partners allows firms to reach an 
exploratory domain and to produce better-quality innovation. Firms depart from path-
dependence through relationships with distant partners. The partners’ novel ideas and 
departure from existing practices will increase exploratory and breakthrough innovations.       
I test the hypotheses regarding the effects of an alliance partner network distance 
on innovation in the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries with 534 R&D 
alliances of 189 firms from 1996 to 2009. I find that alliances with distant partners bring 
about exploratory innovation, while alliances with close partners increase innovation 
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quantity by increasing the number of patents. An alliance with a close partner is useful 
for patent quantity, while an alliance with a distant partner encourages exploratory 
innovation in terms of extended patent categories. Interestingly, an alliance with a partner, 
both technologically and socially distant, results in high-quality innovation.   
This study is expected to offer two contributions. First, this study contributes to a 
longtime debate about the influence of alliance partner choice on innovation by showing 
that a different type of partner brings about a different kind of innovation. I maintain that 
not only a partner’s characteristics, but also the underlying network structure of the 
partner (how two firms are connected in a network) both affect the firm’s innovation. 
This study examines how two firms are connected using the concept of alliance partner 
network distance. The network distance in a dyad is associated with the social capital 
between two firms (Coleman, 1988) and the quality of information (Burt, 1992). In this 
research, I have shown that the social mechanism of close partners and information 
novelty from distant partners lead to different innovation consequences. This study 
reconciles the longtime debate by showing that close partners contribute to firms’ 
innovation by increasing the number of patents (Ahuja, 2000), whereas distant partners 
contribute by helping firms explore new technological areas (Zaheer & Bell, 2005; Burt, 
1992).    
Second, I advance an operationalization of network evolution with the concept of 
network distance. The current research explores dynamic changes of the network 
structure rather than a firm’s static position within a broader network of relationships by 
examining an additional tie formation with the notion of alliance partner network distance. 
Empirical research has not yet examined the impact of dynamic changes of alliance 
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networks on a focal firm’s innovation by looking at the addition of a new alliance partner. 
The research on network evolution requires a simultaneous focus on both dyads and the 
aggregation of dyads into a larger network (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Gulati, Sytch, & 
Tatarynowicz, 2012; Baum, McEvily, & Rowely, 2012). Partner selection is fundamental 
to network evolution, as it is a critical driver of network changes and configurations (for 
example, density or centrality). In particular, new tie formation and partner network 
distance are key components of network evolution in that the addition of a new partner to 
an alliance portfolio may change the ego network structure. By examining an additional 
tie, the current study contributes to the debate by disentangling the effect of an alliance 
from the aggregated network effect, which combines distant and close partners and 
provides a better understanding of how alliance networks and a single additional alliance 
can influence firm innovation. 
 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this literature review, I summarize the key concepts and findings from two bodies of 
work that are relevant to this study: alliances and innovation, and network structure and 
innovation. For each body of research, I summarize the primary theory, relevant 
empirical findings, and literature gaps that my study addresses.   
 
3.2.1 Alliance and Innovation  
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Strategic alliances are a means of accessing external knowledge that a firm does not have 
and can be an effective medium of knowledge transfer and integration (Hamel, 1991). 
However, acquiring knowledge through alliances poses serious challenges during the 
process of detection, transfer, and assimilation of knowledge because knowledge is tacit 
(Polanyi, 1966) and resides in individual employees’ minds or is embedded in 
organizational routines, experience, processes, and networks (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & 
von Krogh, 2009). A concern over unintended knowledge transfer to a partner and 
erosion of the value of the firm’s knowledge resources may also prevent the firm from 
contributing to an alliance (Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008).  
Trust is a solution to the relational risks and facilitates knowledge transfer in an 
alliance (Das & Teng, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998; Lado, Dant, & Tekleab, 
2008). Trust that is available between embedded partners positively affects knowledge 
transfer between firms and increases absorptive capacity (McEvily & Marcus, 2005; Lane, 
Salk, & Lyles, 2001). Therefore, an embedded partner seems preferable for innovation 
over a non-embedded partner. On the other hand, prior literature has shown the benefits 
of non-embedded partners, such as access to diverse non-redundant novel information 
(Burt, 1992) and helping firms overcome their myopia of learning (Levinthal & March, 
1993). However, non-embedded partners come with risks, as well. Non-redundant 
information is not necessarily transferred. There is often a knowledge transfer challenge 
for alliances with non-embedded partners.  
In an effort to understand how partner risk and knowledge transfer challenges 
affect innovation, prior literature on alliances (or any dyadic relationship) and innovation 
investigates the effects of overall alliance partner composition (Phelps, 2010), alliance 
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network structures (i.e., local clustering; Schilling & Phelps, 2007), and the strength of 
ties within a network (Tiwana, 2008, Hansen, 1999) as determinants of firm innovation. 
A literature gap of prior literature is that it views an alliance as a dyadic relationship; 
however, the network structure underlying this dyadic relationship has not been explored. 
The network structure embedded in a dyadic relationship influences partner risk and 
knowledge transfer challenges. If there is a mutual partner between two firms, relational 
risk is reduced (Coleman, 1988) and the novelty of information coming from 
unconnected partners is higher than that from connected partners (Burt, 1992). By linking 
the literature on knowledge transfer with the literature on alliances, we can see how 
innovation is influenced differently with diverse and timely information from distant 
partners, and increased absorptive capacity based on the trust available between close 
partners.   
 
3.2.2 Network Structure and Innovation  
Research that examines the influence of social networks on innovation has explored how 
the network benefits influence knowledge creation. In particular, the configuration of an 
actor's set of direct ties (the actor's egocentric network structure) has received 
considerable attention. However, previous research has yielded conflicting results about 
the influence of network structures on firms’ innovation. On one side of the debate, 
studies have found that structural holes in a firm’s network enhance its knowledge 
creation (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) because they provide 
actors with timely access to diverse information (Burt, 1992) from partners not directly 
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connected to each other, which leads to increased innovation. On the other side of the 
debate, research has suggested that network closure improves knowledge transfer and 
innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Hansen, 
1999) because network closure provides social capital and because such structures 
generate trust, reciprocity norms, and a shared identity, which increase cooperation and 
knowledge sharing (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998).  
One plausible reason for these conflicting results is that a different network 
structure leads to a different kind of innovation. Research on the relationship between 
network structure and innovation only looks at a particular type of innovation, either 
innovation output (Ahuja, 2000; Guler & Nerkar, 2012) or innovation characteristics (i.e., 
exploratory innovation by Phelps, 2010). Given that a particular type of innovation may 
require either social capital of closure (Coleman, 1988) over novel knowledge of a 
structural hole (Burt, 1992) or novel knowledge over social capital, I contend that 
different types of innovation should be examined in network research in a study.     
Another reason for the mixed results is that most studies have only focused on the 
influence of the structural aspect of networks and have largely overlooked the dynamic 
perspective. To the best of my knowledge, none of the literature on the relationship 
between networks and innovation has treated the network as a dynamic structure, 
although some of the literature regarding the network effects on firm performance applies 
to the dynamic perspective (i.e., Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012; McEviliy, Jaffee, & 
Tortoriello, 2012). Prior literature has largely assumed that the outcomes of a network 
structure are exogenous to the structure that created them. However, it is plausible that 
some network advantages precede rather than follow a network position. From a dynamic 
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perspective on networks, I explore the effect of an additional individual alliance rather 
than a cumulative effect of the total alliances of a focal firm in terms of innovation. A 
multilevel approach that considers both the macro level (network level) and micro level 
(actions of an individual firm) enables us to better understand the evolution of a network 
and to explore the dynamic nature of the network (Gulati, Sytch, & Tatarynowicz, 2012; 
Baum, McEvily, & Rowely, 2012). By examining an additional tie, the current study 
contributes to the debate by disentangling the effect of an alliance from the aggregated 
network effect, which combines distant and close partners and provides a better 
understanding of how alliance networks and a single additional alliance can influence 
firm innovation.  
 
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1 Alliance Partner Network Distance  
The benefits and risks involved in close partner and distant partner relationships are 
distinctive. The risks involved in a distant partner alliance include the following. First, 
there is no social mechanism with a distant partner because of the lack of a mutual 
partner. When allying with a distant partner, firms possess limited information about their 
partners’ capabilities, reliability, and motives or their ability to work together effectively. 
Alliances offer many opportunities for cheating, from stealing the partner's technology, to 
providing poorer-quality investments in joint projects, to not fulfilling ex-ante 
commitments. When a firm forms an alliance with a distant partner, the firm cannot 
control the partner’s potential opportunism such as knowledge appropriation (Li, Eden, 
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Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000), and the firm cannot 
sanction the partner’s opportunism due to the lack of social mechanisms and reference for 
a distant partner (Gulati, 1995).  
In contrast, close partners are less relationally risky than distant partners because 
of the social mechanism. First, when a new alliance partner shares a common third party 
with the focal firm, trust and reciprocity are promoted. Trust and reciprocity serve as a 
social control mechanism that mitigates partner opportunism and safeguards the 
exchanges in alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Second, trust and reciprocity between the 
focal firm and a close partner can resolve a part of the exchange hazards and challenges 
to efficient knowledge transfers and inter-firm cooperation (Coleman, 1988; Gulati, 
Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). Finally, interaction with a close partner tends to be more 
intense than one with a distant partner. The interactions improve the detection and 
transfer of tacit and embedded knowledge (Zander & Kogut, 1995) and lead to the 
creation of partner-specific knowledge sharing routines that facilitate knowledge transfers 
(Lane & Lubakin, 1998; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997).  
There are some benefits of an alliance with a distant partner over a close partner. 
First, alliances with distant partners help firms overcome their myopia of learning 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). Local searches cause firms to develop “core rigidities” 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995) or to fall into the “competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988). 
However, an alliance with a distant partner enriches the knowledge pool by adding 
distinctive new variations which provide a sufficient number of choices to solve a 
problem (March, 1991) and to find a recombinatory search (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Second, the literature on structural holes which distant 
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partners build posits that firms in networks rich in structural holes are better able to 
access novel information and resources from a remote part of the network (Burt, 1992). It 
allows the focal firm to hear about the potential threats and opportunities more quickly 
than others and to discover possible exchange partners (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). 
Finally, weak ties are more likely to help firms reach divergent regions of the network, 
leading to novel ideas (Granovetter, 1973). Below, I discuss how the benefits and 
challenges of distant and close partners affect firms’ innovation.  
 
3.3.2 Alliance Partner Network Distance and Innovation  
Current research focuses on three aspects of innovation to examine the effect of alliance 
partner network distance on innovation: innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, and 
innovation quality.  
 
Innovation Quantity   
A relationship based on trust encourages firms to share information and helps them 
integrate new knowledge from the alliance partner. Levine and Prietula (2012) showed 
that embedded exchange, defined as involving a familiar partner, can lead to better 
innovative performance because the intertwinement of economic and social relations 
allows trustful sharing and close coordination which are absent in a market exchange 
(Granovetter, 1983; Uzzi, 1997). Consistent with prior literature, I argue that a firm’s 
competence to increase innovative output improves the benefits from mutual trust and the 
close partner’s willingness to share information.    
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A common context for close interactions between embedded ties such as 
relationally close partners also increases the likelihood of the similarity between the firms 
in terms of their practices and routines and increased innovation output. The 
commonality of organizational routines that are facilitated by proximity builds a shared 
knowledge base and eventually makes for easier interpretation of knowledge gained 
through the mechanism. Firms know how to communicate with their partners more 
clearly based on a shared routine. Easier communication between close partners based on 
information about each other also leads to the quick production of innovative quantity. As 
evidence, Zander and Kogut (1995) empirically showed that the speed of transfer relates 
to how easily capabilities are taught.  
In contrast to a close partner, an alliance with a distant partner may undermine 
knowledge creation as a result of mounting coordination, monitoring costs, and 
operational challenges. First, building alliance governance to mitigate potential relational 
issues consumes managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) and investments of the time and 
effort needed to maintain the relationship and coordinate joint activities in terms of 
negotiating and crafting contracts and monitoring the progress of uncertain research tasks 
(Williamson, 1983). Second, the distance of knowledge creates challenges in its 
acquisition and absorption (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Even when firms seek to 
incorporate external knowledge in their innovation process, the search processes restrict 
external knowledge from being utilized in familiar and proximate areas. As the firm 
moves away from its knowledge base, its probability of success in knowledge creation 
converges to the level of a start-up’s liability of newness (Carroll, 1983; Freeman, Carroll, 
& Hannan, 1983). Finally, it is also possible that the cost of establishing and maintaining 
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a distant tie hinders innovation quantity. As Burt (1992) emphasized, each network tie 
imposes a nontrivial cost on the focal actor. Network members need to invest time and 
resources to build ties with network members and help them as needed (Hansen, Podolny, 
& Pfeffer, 2001). Since a distant partner requires continuous attention due to the lack of a 
social mechanism, alliances with a distant partner may become burdensome for a firm, 
draining the firm’s innovation resources that can be used in other ways. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1. Partner network distance will decrease the focal firm’s subsequent 
innovation quantity.    
 
Exploratory Innovation  
Embedded exchanges can lead to better performance for the short-term because the 
intertwined economic and social relations allow trusted sharing and close coordination 
(Levine & Prietula, 2012). However, focusing on embedded exchanges can also harm 
long-term performance because it is "deep rather than wide" (Uzzi, 1997, p. 51; Gupta, 
Smith, & Shalley, 2006).  
Long-term innovation success occurs when firms search more broadly for 
knowledge in a variety of technological domains (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). First, the difference between the knowledge that 
resides in a far distant partner creates the potential for non-overlapping knowledge bases 
for the focal firm (Burt, 1992). The exposure to heterogeneous knowledge from a distant 
partner should improve recognition of opportunities and raise the creative potential of the 
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firm. Knowledge diversity from various contacts is also useful in the implementation of 
new ideas, particularly when the tasks are multifaceted or complex. It may help firms 
build a sound causal understanding of the relationships between elements in the complex 
system that they are proposing, and thus may help firms navigate a project to a successful 
outcome (McGrath, Tsai, Venkatraman, & MacMillan, 1996). This claim is consistent 
with prior research (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 
2010) showing that firms benefit more from dense networks when innovation is 
incremental, and more from structural holes when innovation is disruptive. A firm with a 
sparse network of disconnected contacts is likely to pick up a wider array of information 
about current events, news, and gossip, privileged by both a greater range of information 
circulation in the firm and the ability to test its accuracy through independent 
confirmation.  
Long-term innovation success also occurs when achieving the goal of developing 
truly radical innovation represents a clear departure from existing practices. Path-
dependence learning is not helpful. Rather, novelty is critical for developing radical 
innovations (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996). However, 
embedded ties may have developed a similarity of mental maps for innovation that 
inhibits novelty. When a firm does not have knowledge similar to that of the partner’s 
knowledge, the context and communication from the partner is likely to be novel to the 
firm. Novel information is not only new to the firm, but also non-redundant. The 
recombinant view (Fleming, 2002; Henderson & Clark, 1990) suggests that new 
knowledge is created by a combination of new components or new combinations of 
existing components. The incorporation of knowledge from a distant partner introduces 
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heterogeneity and increases the opportunity set of new components that can be utilized. 
According to Rodan and Galunic (2004), the lack of constraint that a distant partner 
provides should assist in the pursuit of entrepreneurial activities by facilitating 
autonomous strategic behaviors.  This leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Partner network distance will increase the focal firm’s exploratory 
innovation. 
 
Innovation Quality  
The current study examines the impact of innovations on the overall industry with quality 
innovation from novel, emerging, and pioneering technologies. A high-impact technology 
innovation serves as the basis for future technologies, products, and services. As an 
example, a breakthrough innovation enables firms to challenge the existing technological 
order and shape new trajectories, and allows them to engage in corporate reinvention, 
business growth, and new business development by taking on technological leadership 
(Burgleman, 1983). In developing a breakthrough or influential innovation, firms that 
retain technological leadership in their industry build their competence base and assets 
and gain greater strength in their competitive position and attractiveness (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986).  
A central idea about innovation quality is that external knowledge or knowledge 
that spans boundaries is vital for valuable innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Fleming, 
2001). An emerging field that threatens an existing dominant design is often supported by 
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many different disciplines, allowing the firm to invent more innovative knowledge. 
Novel technologies (in which the firm lacks prior experience) and pioneering 
technologies (that do not build on any existing technologies) from different disciplines 
lead to breakthrough innovations (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). A search in novel areas 
increases the firm’s inventive performance in the emerging field by increasing the 
number of possible combinations between the new knowledge from a different 
technological landscape and existing components (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990) and exposing R&D staff to new problem-solving techniques 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  
Prior literature on breakthrough innovations has focused on the technological 
domain as an external source of new non-redundant knowledge for breakthrough 
innovations (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquish, & Marsh, 2006; 
Jiang, Tan, & Thursby, 2010). I suggest that network distance is another source of 
breakthrough knowledge. Distant partners increase the focal firm’s search for novel 
knowledge through interactions with the partnering firm’s inventors who introduce new 
insights and expertise to the focal firm. This novel knowledge helps these firms keep up 
with the changing field, develop new techniques, and avoid being left behind. As 
evidence, Jiang, Tan and Thursby (2010) showed that an alliance increases a firm’s 
inventive performance in an emerging field when the partners are diverse in terms of 
technological distance.  
In contrast to a distant partner, an alliance with a close partner is likely to be 
constrained by ossified routines and structures that hinder breakthrough innovations 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Rigid mental models and deeply embedded routines serve to 
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naturally limit the mature firm’s foray into producing high-impact innovations. Inertia, 
which is a source of organizational rigidity, is a negative side of a relationship with a 
close partner. Strict rules from embedded relationships exacerbate creative thinking 
because rigid monitoring and control mechanisms reduce the potential generation of new 
ideas. Firms are less likely to be willing to experiment with new ways of thinking, as they 
increasingly rely on their customary routines. Their obligations and reciprocity may lead 
firms to routines with which they are already familiar with rather than to experiment with 
new ideas (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). Thus,  
 
Hypothesis 3. Partner network distance will increase innovation quality.   
 
3.3.3 Contingent Effect of Technological Distance  
Alliances with partners of technological relatedness may increase the redundancy of ideas, 
skills sets, and knowledge which leads to a sub-additive alliance portfolio (Vassolo et al., 
2004).  Additionally, technological distance between two firms decreases the probability 
of knowledge appropriation because of the lack of similarity in knowledge bases.  
Without a concern about knowledge appropriation, firms are more likely to share their 
knowledge based on the increased level of trust between the two firms.  I propose that 
technological distance offsets a weak knowledge flow with a distant partner leading to a 
high level of innovation quantity. Thus,   
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Hypothesis 4a. Technological distance weakens the negative relationship between 
partner network distance and innovation quantity such that high technological 
distance and high network distance increase innovation quantity.   
 
Although an alliance allows access to a partner’s knowledge, it does not guarantee 
the effective detection, transfer, and assimilation of this knowledge. In particular, 
excessively new technologies without a deep understanding can have harmful 
consequences due to information overload, confusion, and diseconomies of scale 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001).  
Technological distance worsens this problem since a firm’s absorptive capacity in 
relation to its partner will decline (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Technological relatedness 
between two firms facilitates knowledge flow, successful collaboration and eventually 
value creation. Similar knowledge bases (i.e., they possess knowledge in similar 
technological domains) are more likely to establish and create better performing alliances 
(Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Siverman, 
1996).  Prior studies provide evidence that partners’ technological relatedness (or 
technological closeness) increases their ability to assimilate and utilize each other’s 
know-how, that is, their absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), which ultimately 
increases the amount of value that is created through alliances. Therefore, firms face 
challenges to internalize and utilize non-redundant novel information from partners who 
are technologically and relationally distant. Thus,  
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Hypothesis 4b. Technological distance weakens the positive relationship between 
partner network distance and exploratory innovation such that high technological 
distance and high network distance decrease exploratory innovation.   
 
Breakthrough innovation requires bundling heterogeneous resources and 
nonobvious technology components. The breadth of a portfolio’s resources helps a focal 
firm engage in a greater degree of exploration. Exposure to partners’ diverse technologies 
broadens the firm’s perspective and increases its ability to generate quality innovations. 
Utilization of technologically distant knowledge that is new to the firm allows it to avoid 
the familiarity trap, thus providing a basis for breakthrough innovations. As evidence, 
knowledge from beyond the firm's technological domain leads to innovations that have a 
significant impact on subsequent technological developments (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). 
Thus, a superior alliance partner with a diverse and unique mix of valuable resources 
helps a firm create breakthrough innovations. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4c. Technological distance strengthens the positive relationship 
between partner network distance and innovation quality such that high 
technological distance and high network distance increase innovation quality.   
 
3.4 METHODS 
3.4.1 Sample and Data Sources  
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I examined the hypotheses in a longitudinal study of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries in the United States between 1996 and 2009. The sample was 
drawn from U.S. firms in these industries that were present in the Acquisitions and 
Alliances database of the Security Data Company (SDC) from 1996 to 2009. The 
pharmaceutical industry has four SIC codes: 2833 (medicinal chemicals and botanical 
products), 2834 (pharmaceutical preparations), 2835 (in-vitro and in-vivo diagnostic 
substances), and 2836 (biological products, except diagnostic substances). The 
biotechnology industry refers to the manipulation of genetic material through 
recombinant DNA technology, cell fusion, and monoclonal antibodies, and includes the 
codes 8731 (commercial physical and biological research), 8732 (commercial 
nonphysical research), 8733 (noncommercial research organizations), and 8734 (testing 
laboratories). These two industries are particularly suited for testing my hypotheses for 
two reasons. First, these industries are an appropriate context to test theories of 
innovation as a consequence since (1) a patent is a proxy for the firm’s technology 
capability to combine various types of knowledge, (2) the innovation value chain in those 
industries, and (3) firms routinely patent their inventions (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). 
Second, high technology industries such as the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries are a good context to test the effects of distant partners since a consistent flow 
of new entrants may occur in these industries. Thus, they continue to experience 
disruptive technological changes and a combination of various technologies. Finally, 
alliances in these industries are prevalent because accessing another firm’s capabilities is 
a key to success.  
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I used patent data to measure technological knowledge because patents are valid 
and robust indicators of knowledge transfer and knowledge creation (Trajtenberg, 1987). 
Previous research has confirmed that patents are a reliable measure of innovation. The 
patent data come from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). I used 
the application date to assign a granted patent to a firm because this date closely captures 
the timing of knowledge creation (Griliches, 1990) and is the first date when the patent is 
available to the partner.   
To construct the network distance variable, I obtained alliance information such 
as the date, types, and partners from the Acquisitions and Alliances database of the 
Security Data Company. I pulled a nearly complete network configuration to capture 
information about how many steps a firm is connected with a partner. I collected 
information on firms for control variables from Standard & Poor’s Compustat. My unit of 
analysis is an R&D alliance. A total of 534 alliance cases of 189 firms were observed for 
the analysis after accounting for missing financial data from Compustat.   
 
3.4.2 Measures  
Dependent variable.  My theory suggests that alliance partner distance has a distinctive 
impact on innovation subsequent to the alliance formation. Following prior studies that 
use patents to study innovation (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002; Lahiri, 2010), I concentrated 
only on the patents granted in the United States.  
Post-alliance performance has been examined with three- to five-year windows 
after the deal was announced. Following Sampson (2007), I used a four-year moving 
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window to compute the innovation measures: innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, 
and innovation quality. I measured the dependent variables for the three hypotheses in the 
following ways.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that an alliance with a close partner increases innovation 
quantity. Innovation quantity was measured as the number of patents generated by a focal 
firm in a given year after an alliance formation (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Almeida & 
Phene, 2004; Josh & Nerkar, 2011; Wu, 2012) controlling for technological distance and 
innovation quantity before the alliance. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the relationship between partner distance and exploratory 
innovation. I constructed the ratio of a new patent class entrance beyond a focal firm's 
existing classes for exploratory innovation. To capture the proportion of exploratory 
searches building on unfamiliar knowledge, I applied the patent classes (U.S. Class) that 
a focal firm entered into after an alliance formation for exploratory innovation as the first 
measure (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Jiang, Tan, & Thursby, 
2010). Patents are classified by the patent examiner in technology “classes” that represent 
different technological areas. The technology classes are used as an indicator of a firm’s 
areas of technological expertise (Jaffe, 1986). The extent to which a firm enters new 
technological domains is indicative of exploration, according to the definition of 
exploration (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). This measure is broader 
than the citation-based measure, since it takes into account all technology classes in 
which a firm might obtain a patent. I computed this measure as the ratio of the number of 
new U.S. classes in which firm i received a patent in year t, classifying a technology class 
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as new if the firm had not received a patent in that class within the past four years over 
the total number of categories.  
In Hypothesis 3, I examined how network distance affects the innovation quality 
or the impact of a patent. Patents vary in terms of their economic value (Trajtenberg, 
1990). Certain patents may have little effect on a firm's fortune, so a simple count of 
patents should be distinguished from the knowledge value. I measured innovation quality 
with an annual citation-per-patent measure (Wu, 2011). Concerning the forward citation 
measure, bibliometric studies have repeatedly demonstrated that subsequent citations to a 
patent are associated with its technological importance and value by creating a "ripple 
effect" (Fleming 2001).  To construct the measure, I calculated the citation counts of a 
firm's patents for the four-year window after an alliance and divided that number by the 
total number of patents during the window (Levitas & McFadyen, 2004; Josh & Nerkar, 
2011).  
A key difference between exploratory innovation and innovation quality is that 
exploratory innovation is defined from the firm’s perspective, whereas the search is 
exploitative or exploratory in reference to a particular firm’s knowledge base. In contrast, 
innovation quality is related to field knowledge as a whole.      
 
Independent variables.  The independent variable indicates whether a sample company 
chose a distant or close partner for a given year. The distance between the focal firm and 
its new partner was measured by an alternative minimum path length (geodesic) toward 
the partner from the focal firm (Podolny, 1994; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007). For example, when the focal firm could reach its partner D through firm C 
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(indicating that there was a mutual partnership between the focal firm and its partner D) 
before the focal firm and its partner D formed an alliance, the distance of partner D is 2, 
as Figure 3-1 illustrates. If the focal firm could reach its partner through three firms in the 
shortest alternative path before a direct relationship between the focal firm and its partner 
was formed, the distance is 4
5
.  
To compute the alliance partner network distance, this study extended ego 
networks into two degrees of alliances, in other words, pulling the alliance partners of the 
focal firms’ partners. Without information on alliance termination, the network cannot be 
structured. Unfortunately, the termination date of an alliance is unclear, since firms 
typically do not declare their termination, and the SDC does not often provide a 
termination date
6
. As a remedy for the lack of alliance termination dates, the prior 
literature has used a moving window to construct network structures. Following a 
common practice in the alliance research (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, Stuart, & 
Hannan, 1996), I used a four-year moving window to account for the duration of each 
alliance. For example, when an alliance was formed in 1998, then the alliance lasted until 
2002. The adjacency matrix for a given year records alliances formed in that year and in 
any of the previous three years. I assigned 1 to each alliance if firms i and j entered into 
an alliance in a given year, or 0 otherwise (Bae & Garguilo, 2004). I also added alliances 
occurring up to three years prior to the sample years in order to control for possible left-
censoring problems. 
                                                          
5
 Note that I treated the cases where there was no firm in between as infinite distance, meaning that the 
partner was an infinitely distant partner of distance 6. The very first alliance partner for firms was treated as 
0, as the definition implies that there is no common partner. 
6
 A total of 1,823 termination dates have been reported out of 127,523 alliances from 1990 to 2010, which 
is approximately 1.4% of the total alliance observations. 
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The moderator variable of technological distance indicates the extent to which 
partner firms patented in distinctive technology classes based on the class and subclass 
within the U.S. patent classification system with a four-year window. The variable was 
measured by a reverse ratio of the common technological domain with partners, divided 
by the number of total technological classes of the focal firm (Ahuja & Katila, 2001).  
 
FIGURE 3-1: Illustration of Alliance Partner Distance 
 
Control variables. To minimize alternative explanations and isolate the marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables, I controlled for several alliance-, network-, firm-, and 
innovation-level variables whose influence on innovation might be confounded with the 
explanatory variable.  
A 
B 
C 
  
Distance of D at 
time t-1 : 4  
Distance of C at time t-1 
: 2 
D Direct tie at time t  
Distant Partner  
Close Partner  
Focal Firm  
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Cross-border alliance. International alliances may provide access to diverse knowledge 
(Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) on the one hand, and may cause greater coordination and 
communication problems and cultural conflicts diminishing interfirm learning, on the 
other hand (Lyles & Salk, 1996).  The cross-border alliance is a dummy variable which 
coded international alliances as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Alliance governance. Research suggests that an equity joint venture is a superior 
governance mechanism for inter-firm learning and knowledge transfer (Kogut, 1988; 
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). The alliance governance measure is a dummy 
variable which coded joint ventures as 1, and 0 otherwise.    
Geographical distance. Geographical distance indicates the extent to which the cost of 
knowledge transfer increases and the frequency of personal contact that builds social 
relations decreases. It was measured by miles based on the zip codes of their headquarters 
(Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003).  
Number of structural holes. To control for network configuration, I assessed the presence 
or absence of structural holes in the network of the focal firms and constructed the 
structural holes as constraints using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). I 
calculated the structural holes as one minus the firm’s constraint score (Zaheer & Bell, 
2005).  
Cluster coefficient. The average clustering coefficient was measured as the number of 
actual links connecting all neighbors of a focal firm with one another, divided by the 
number of all possible ties among those nodes to distinguish small world networks from 
random networks  to control for an alternative of network distance (Gulati, Sytch, & 
Tatarynowicz, 2012; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
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R&D intensity.  A firm’s R&D expenditure is its investment in knowledge creation 
(Griliches, 1990) and contributes to its ability to absorb external knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). It was measured by dividing a firm’s R&D expenses by its sales in the 
year of an alliance formation. 
Debt ratio. Debt ratio has frequently been used in the literature on organizational slack 
(Bourgeois, 1981).  Availability of slack resources tends to increase an exploratory search 
(Singh, 1986) and leads to greater innovation performance (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Debt 
ratio was measured by long-term debt, divided by total assets.   
Prior performance. Prior profitability affects a decision-maker’s optimism (Cyert & 
March, 1963) and the funds available for R&D. Profitability was measured as the 
previous ROA, the ratio of net income to the year-end value of total assets.   
Presample innovation. Prealliance innovation was added to control for a firm’s 
propensity to file for a patent to exploit, explore, and produce better-quality patents, as 
well as a firm’s technological capability (Silverman, 1999).   
 Table 3-1 provides a summary of variable operationalization.  
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TABLE 3-1: Variable Operationalization 
 
Variable Type Operationalization 
Data 
Sources 
Innovation  
Quantity 
Number  
Number of patents generated by a focal firm during a 4-year window 
after alliance formation  
USPTO 
Exploratory 
Innovation  
Ratio 
Continuous 
Number of new U.S. classes in which firm i filed a patent in the past 
four years over the total number of categories.  USPTO 
Innovation  
Quality  
Ratio 
Continuous 
Average number of citations received by those patents within four years 
of the applicant year  USPTO 
Partner 
Distance 
Category 
Alternative minimum path length toward the partner from the focal firm 
at time t-1 
Average value of distances of each alliance at time t 
Derived 
from SDC 
Technological 
Distance  
Continuous  
Reverse ratio of the common technological domain with partners, 
divided by the number of total technological classes of the focal firm 
USPTO 
Cross-border 
Alliance 
Dummy Cross-border alliance: 1; non cross-border alliance: 0 
Derived 
from SDC 
Alliance 
Governance 
Dummy Joint venture: 1; non-joint venture: 0 
Derived 
from SDC 
Geographical  
Distance  
Continuous Miles based on the zip codes of the partners’ headquarters 
Derived 
from SDC 
Structural  
Holes  
Continuous 1 - the firm’s constraint score 
Derived 
from SDC 
Clustering  
Coefficient  
Continuous 
Number of actual links connecting all neighbors of a focal firm with one 
another, divided by the number of all possible ties among those nodes 
Derived 
from SDC 
R&D Intensity Continuous In-process R&D expenses divided by sales 
COMPUST
AT 
Debt Ratio Continuous Long-term debt divided by total assets 
COMPUST
AT 
Past 
Performance 
Continuous ROA at t-1 
COMPUST
AT 
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3.4.3 Model Specification and Estimation   
Hypothesis 1 suggests that a close partner produces more patents, and the argument 
behind Hypotheses 2 and 3 is that forming an alliance with a distant partner leads to 
exploratory innovation and better quality, respectively.  Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c regard 
interaction effects between network distance and technological distance on innovation 
quantity, exploratory innovation, and innovation quality, respectively.    
 Arguably, the controls may not fully eliminate omitted-variable bias because there 
may still be unobserved features of a firm’s network and innovation that both affect 
network distance and innovation. I am also concerned about the possibility of reverse 
causality; that is, firms choose either distant partners or close partners to increase a 
particular type of innovation. Both concerns may result in biased estimates due to 
nonrandomized assignments of observations to levels of the independent variable of 
interest (Holland, 1986). To address these concerns, I use the instrumental variable 
approach in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation with a policy shock in the first 
stage to predict an exogenous change in the main variable (Berry & Waldfogel, 2001; 
Woodridge, 2002).   
 For alliance partner network distance, I used the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a 
policy shock. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was created to make top managers 
responsible to shareholders for management. It required that independent directors be 
objective, shareholder-focused monitors of management; therefore, increasing their 
representation on boards should uniformly improve corporate governance. Independent 
directors are custodians of shareholder interests, so their presence on the board helps 
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reduce agency problems. Increasing board monitoring and reducing agency problems 
lead to managers taking greater risks in alliance partner selection, resulting in allying 
with distant partners. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 captures observations occurring 
after the Act's enactment year, i.e., it takes the value of 1 for alliances occurring after 
2002 and 0 otherwise. In the first stage of the 2SLS estimation, I predict alliance partner 
network distance with the instrument and control variables.  
11643210tan   itititititit PerfFirmNTWKAllianceSOAceDisa , 
where Distanceit denotes the partner network distance of firm i toward its partner at time t; 
SOAit represents the dummy variable to capture observations occurring after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Allianceit  indicates the joint-venture, cross-border, 
technological distance, and geographical distance with the partner of firm i at time t; 
NTWK it  indicates the structural hole, and clustering coefficient; Firm it indicates the 
focal firm’s debt ratio, and R&D intensity; and Perfit-1 is the performance of firm i at time 
t-1. 
By using the 2SLS command in Stata, which performs the standard variance 
adjustments for the coefficient in the second stage, I obtained a consistent and efficient 
estimate, which I used to test the hypotheses. In the second stage, I traced how the 
alliance partner network distance results in a change in innovation. I used a moving 
window dependent variable. In the second stage, I estimated the main model with the 
same control variables as the first stage.  
11543210 )tan(   itititititit PerfFirmNTWKAllianceceDispredictedInnovation
 
 To test H4, which is an interaction effect of technological distance,  
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3.5 RESULTS  
Table 3-2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables and a correlation matrix for 
all variables used in this study. The patent quantity and pre-patent quantity are highly 
correlated, while the other correlations are relatively low. To confirm that 
multicollinearity is not a concern, the variance inflation factors for the full model are 
from 2.42 to 4.12, well below the commonly used threshold of 10.0 (Chatterjee & Price, 
1991).   
Since the focal firm’s innovation may influence alliance partner choice, alliance 
partner network distance may be endogenous, in which case a simple OLS would yield 
biased coefficients. Therefore, I applied 2SLS, generating consistent coefficient estimates. 
This benefit must be balanced against the fact that 2SLS coefficients are subject to bias 
when instruments may be weak. In response, I report both 2SLS and OLS in Table 3-4 
and Table 3-7, respectively, in the Results section.  
Since the research model involves interactions between alliance partners’ 
technological distance and alliance partner network distance, I require two instrumental 
variables: one main effect and one interaction (Wooldridge, 2002). Even if two 
instrumental variables may be available, the bias induced by having many instrumental 
variables would yield highly suspect results. Given this unavoidable limitation, I ran the 
models once with OLS and once using instruments for alliance partner network distance.   
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TABLE 3-2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Correlation 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Patent  
Quantity  
98.87 172.40 1 849 1.00                
2. Exploratory 
Innovation 
23.03 33.01 0 100 -0.33 1.00               
3. Innovation 
Quality 
3.15 6.49 .01 188 0.00 -0.16 1.00              
4. Network 
Distance 
.95 .21 0 1 -0.16 0.09 -0.01 1.00             
5. Technological 
Distance  
.96 .12 0 1 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.07 1.00            
6. Cross-border 
Alliance 
.07 .27 0 1 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.06 1.00           
7. Alliance 
Governance  
.09 .28 0 1 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00          
8. Geographical 
distance  
1687.09 1376.95 0 16593.7 0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 1.00         
9. Structural Holes .27 .33 0 1.1 -0.36 0.20 0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 1.00        
10. Clustering 
Coefficients 
.03 .11 0 1 0.01 -0.01 0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.08 1.00       
11. R&D Intensity  -.48 11.38 -494.14 0 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 1.00      
12. Debt Ratio .15 .32 0 8.58 -0.09 0.09 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 1.00     
13. Prior 
Performance 
-.32 1.52 -34.44 .66 0.33 -0.16 -0.04 -0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.05 0.02 -0.06 1.00    
14. Prior Patent 
Quantity  
109.32 199.92 1 873 0.75 -0.35 -0.09 -0.16 0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.38 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.33 1.00   
15. Prior 
Exploratory 
Innovation  
30.81 36.13 0 100 -0.18 0.28 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.00 0.10 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.15 -0.23 1.00  
16. Prior Quality  2.67 4.20 .02 53 -0.18 0.07 0.27 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.23 -0.21 0.20 1.00 
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TABLE 3-3: The Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Network Distance 
1996-2009, Results of First-stage Logit Analysis    
 
 
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 
 FIRM CONTROLS   
Cross-border Alliance   -.64† 
(.36) 
-.46  
(.36) 
Alliance Governance  -.57 
(.37) 
-.50 
(.38) 
Technological Distance  2.36 *** 
(.66) 
2.25 ** 
(.66) 
Geographical Distance  -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Structural Holes  1.92 ** 
(.58) 
1.64** 
(.57) 
Cluster Coefficient -1.47 
(1.00) 
-.88 
(1.05) 
R&D Investment -.02 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.10) 
Debt Ratio .79 
(.66) 
.51 
(.64) 
Prior Performance -1.11 ** 
(.40) 
-.91 * 
(.40) 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE      
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002   .82 *** 
(.23) 
INTERCEPT  1.05 
(.67) 
.85 
(.67) 
No. of Observations  1942 1942 
No. of Groups  363 363 
Log pseudo likelihood  -350.87 -344.31 
Wald chi-square test for overall fit  56.88 58.70 
Pseudo R squared   0.07 0.09 
 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p <.01  *** p <.001  
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
The partner industry dummy is controlled.  
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I used the Sargan-Hansen statistics test to detect potential endogeneity in alliance 
partner network distance because it is more robust to heteroskedasticity than the 
Hausman test. The result does not indicate the presence of endogeneity in terms of over-
identifying restriction. This gives me some confidence that even with the interaction 
terms added, the impact of endogeneity is limited.  
I went through postestimation tests. First, I used Stata’s estat endogenous 
procedure to test the hypothesis that the endogenous variables are actually endogenous 
using the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test. The variable of alliance partner network distance 
is endogenous since p<0.001. Second, I used Stata’s estat firststage to test whether there 
is a weak-instrument problem. R-square is high enough to confirm that there is no weak-
instrument problem (R-sq= 0.12). However, minimum eigenvalue statistic of 4.3 does not 
exceed the critical value of LIML estimator. It potentially implies a weak-instrument 
problem. Third, I used Stata’s estat overid to test the instrument for validity. There is no 
overidentifying restriction.       
Table 3-3 shows the results of the first-stage logit regression with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 as an instrumental variable. The first regression indicates that I have 
achieved meaningful instrumentation. The impact is significant and positive on alliance 
partner network distance, as I predicted. 
Table 3-4 presents the results of the 2SLS analysis used to test the hypotheses. 
Models 2-1, 3-1, and 4-1 show the results of the second-stage regression analysis. Models 
2-2, 3-2, and 4-2 show results of the interaction effect of technological distance with 
network distance on innovation consequences.  
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Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative effect of network distance on the number of 
patents applied for after an alliance. Model 2-1 in Table 3-4 strongly supports this 
hypothesis (β=-383.85, p < .05). The marginal effect of the coefficient is -129.53. An 
increase in network distance would be associated with 129.53 fewer patents. The results 
indicate that an alliance with a close partner leads to more patents than a distant partner 
after an alliance, controlling for the pre-alliance number of patents. This result is 
consistent with prior studies that show network closure increases innovation, which is 
measured by the number of patents (Ahuja, 2000).   
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the effect of network distance on exploratory innovation. 
In Hypothesis 2, I predict that network distance will increase exploratory innovation. The 
positive effect of distance on new patent class entrance is statistically marginal (β=77.93, 
p<.10). The marginal effect of the coefficient is 23.38. An increase in network distance 
would be associated with 23.38 additional patent classes. The result confirms prior 
research by Zaheer and Bell (2005), which indicated that access to structural holes 
enhances firm innovation as measured by new technology adaptation.  
Hypothesis 3 addresses the effect of network distance on innovation quality. In 
Model 4-1 in Table 3-4, the result shows that a negative effect was evident on innovation 
quality, contrary to my prediction. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are supported. The results signify that technological 
distance negatively moderates the negative relationship between network distance and 
innovation quantity. In addition, technological distance negatively moderates the positive 
relationship between network distance and exploratory innovation. Regarding Hypothesis 
4c, the result signifies that technological distance negatively moderates the negative 
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relationship between innovation quality and network distance while I hypothesized 
technological distance positively moderates the positive relationship between innovation 
quality and network distance.   
Hypothesis 4a postulates a moderating role of technological distance on the 
negative relationship between alliance partner network distance and innovation quantity. 
The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive and significant (β=528.32, 
p<.05) in Model 2-2, confirming support for Hypothesis 4a.  
Figure 3-2 illustrates the predicted value of innovation quantity of the interaction 
between network distance and technological distance. For an alliance with 
technologically close partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 82.25 fewer 
patents compared to an alliance with close partner. For an alliance with technologically 
distant partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 34. 39 fewer patents compared 
to an alliance with close partner. Thus, technological distance negatively moderates the 
negative relationship between network distance and innovation quantity in support of 
Hypothesis 4a.   
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FIGURE 3-2: Predicted Value of Innovation Quantity by Network Distance and 
Technological Distance        
 
 
Model 3-2 introduces the interaction effect of technological distance on the 
positive relationship between network distance and exploratory innovation. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term is significant (β=-107.48 p<.05), offering 
support for Hypothesis 4b.  
Figure 3-3 illustrates the predicted value of exploration innovation of the 
interaction between network distance and technological distance. For an alliance with 
technologically close partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 1.33 fewer new 
patent classes compared to an alliance with close partner. For an alliance with 
technologically distant partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 6.73 fewer new 
patents classes compared to an alliance with close partner. The result implies that an 
alliance with a partner that is both technologically and relationally distant leads to less 
exploratory innovation. Thus, technological distance negatively moderates the positive 
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relationship between network distance and exploratory innovation in support of 
Hypothesis 4b.  
 
FIGURE 3-3: Predicted Value of Exploratory Innovation by Network Distance and 
Technological Distance        
 
 
Model 4-2 in Table 3-5 introduces a moderating effect of technological distance 
on the relationship between network distance and innovation quality. The comparison 
across high and low technological distance is shown in Model 4-2, with the sample split 
by technological distance with a partner. Network distance negatively affects innovation 
quality with low technological distance. Hypothesis 3 is not supported, showing a 
negative relationship between network distance and innovation quality. However, with an 
interaction effect of technological distance, an alliance with a distant partner increases 
innovation quality both in terms of forward citation and patent generality, as Model 4-2 
in Table 3-4 indicates (β=5.90, p <.05).  The result implies that technological distance 
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negatively moderates the negative relationship between network distance and innovation 
quality.  
Figure 3-4 illustrates the predicted value of innovation quality of the interaction 
between network distance and technological distance. For an alliance with 
technologically close partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 0.14 more forward 
citation per patent compared to an alliance with close partner. For an alliance with 
technologically distant partner, an alliance with distant partner produces 0.21 more 
forward citation per patent compared to an alliance with close partner. The result implies 
that an alliance with a partner that is both technologically and relationally distant leads to 
best quality innovation. Thus, technological distance negatively moderates the negative 
relationship between network distance and innovation quality.  
 
FIGURE 3-4: Predicted Value of Innovation Quality by Network Distance and 
Technological Distance     
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TABLE 3-4: The Effects of Alliance Partner Network Distance on Innovation, 1996-
2009, Results of 2SLS Analysis     
 
 
Model2-1 Model2-2 Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 4-1 Model 4-2 
H1 H4a H2 H4b H3 H4c 
Innovation Quantity 
Exploratory  
Innovation 
Innovation 
Quality 
Measures No. of Patents Patent Class Forward Citation  
 Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction 
ALLIANCE CONTROL  
Cross-border Alliance  
 
92.38 
(91.00)  
65.70 
(91.63) 
-18.75 
(20.20) 
-12.30 
(19.36) 
1.41 
(1.07) 
1.13 
(1.13) 
Alliance Governance  
 
-97.76 
(83.13) 
-125.86 
(94.32) 
6.05 
(18.47) 
10.44 
(19.93) 
-.59 
(.87) 
-.93 
(1.00) 
Technological Distance 
  
721.54 † 
(396.26) 
109.58 † 
(59.32) 
-134.18 
(86.66) 
-20.60 
(12.58) 
6.84 * 
(3.47) 
1.14 & 
(.56) 
Geographical Distance  
 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
00 
(.00) 
NETWORK CONTROLS        
Structural Holes  
 
38.86 
(64.47) 
17.46 
(62.08) 
-14.04 
(14.35) 
-8.58 
(13.15) 
1.42 
(.87) 
1.15 
(.87) 
Cluster Coefficients  
   
-127.95 
(192.97) 
-47.51 
(184.70) 
33.79 
(43.23) 
13.31 
(39.27) 
.78 
(2.15) 
1.63 
(2.23) 
FIRM CONTROLS       
R&D Intensity 
 
4.26  
(16.43) 
8.97 
(17.57) 
.25 
(3.59) 
-.53 
(3.71) 
-.07 
(.19) 
-.02 
(.21) 
Debt Ratio 
 
49.89 
(72.52) 
48.55 
(74.75) 
-24.26 
(15.97) 
-23.21 
(15.77) 
.81 
(.84) 
.83 
(.92) 
Prior Performance   
 
-6.38 
(24.45) 
.90 
(24.49) 
5.74 
(5.53) 
3.54 
(5.26) 
-.16 
(.30) 
-.07 
(.31) 
INNOVATION CONTROLS       
Pre-alliance Patent Stock  .15  
(.24) 
.22 
(.23) 
.06 
(.05) 
.05 
(.05) 
- - 
Pre-alliance Number of ICL 
Class 
- - .33* 
(.13) 
.25 * 
(.13) 
- - 
Pre-alliance Innovation Quality  - - - - .26** 
(.08) 
.27 ** 
(.09) 
Post-alliance Exploration  - - - - -.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
HYPOTHESIS EFFECTS        
Network Distance    -383.85 * 
(184.51) 
-553.97 * 
(277.34) 
77.93 † 
(41.44) 
109.73 † -3.88 ** 
(1.50) 
-6.01 * 
(2.53) 
Network Distance *  
Technological Distance  
- 528.32 * 
(269.42) 
- -107.48 * - 5.90 * 
(2.53) 
Observations  534 534 534 534 534 534 
Groups 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Wald chi-square test for overall 
fit 
70.54  65.82 11.79 11.76 20.60 17.39 
Root MSE  394.35  408.43 85.69 86.19 4.59 5.00 
 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p <.01  *** p <.001  
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
The partner industry dummy control is included.    
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Table 3-5 presents a summary of the empirical findings of this study. Overall, the 
results of the empirical analyses provide strong support for the effects of alliance partner 
network distance on innovation in terms of patent quantity, exploratory patents, and 
patent quality, as well as a moderating effect of alliance partner technological distance.    
 
TABLE 3-5: The Summary of the Empirical Findings of 2SLS  
 Prediction Coeff. 
Estimate 
Finding 
H1  Partner network distance will decrease the 
focal firm’s subsequent innovation quantity.    
-383.85 Supported  
(p<0.05)  
H2  Partner network distance will increase the 
focal firm’s exploratory innovation. 
77.93 Marginally 
Supported  
(p<0.1) 
H3 Partner network distance will increase 
innovation quality. 
-3.88 Not 
Supported  
(p<0.01) 
H4a  Technological distance negatively moderates 
the negative relationship between partner 
network distance and innovation quantity, 
such that high technological distance and high 
network distance increase innovation quantity. 
528.32 Supported  
(p<0.05)  
H4b Technological distance negatively moderates 
the positive relationship between partner 
network distance and exploratory innovation, 
such that high technological distance and high 
network distance decrease exploratory 
innovation. 
-107.48 Supported  
(p<0.05) 
H4c Technological distance positively moderates 
the positive relationship between partner 
network distance and exploratory innovation, 
such that high technological distance and high 
network distance increase innovation quality. 
5.90 Not 
Supported  
(p<0.05) 
 
2.5.1 Robustness Tests  
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Two dimensions that appear to be important for robustness purposes are alternative 
measures of innovation consequences and OLS models.    
 
Alternative Measure. Alternative measures of exploratory innovation for Hypothesis 2 
and innovation quality for Hypothesis 3 appear to be important for robustness purposes. 
A review of empirical studies on innovation used alternative measures of the self-citation 
ratio and the patent class of citation for exploratory innovation, and patent generality for 
patent quality. The results with the alternative measures are consistent with the results 
that are reported in Table 3-4.  
For exploratory innovation, I applied an alternative measure of non-self-citation 
(Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Self-citing 
occurs when a patent filed by a focal firm includes in its list of citations one or more 
patents belonging to itself. The presence of new and unfamiliar citations indicates that the 
firm is building on unfamiliar knowledge rather than on its own existing or familiar 
knowledge, which is congruent with the definition of an exploratory search. I calculated 
the proportion of non-self-citations as the reverse ratio of the number of self-citations by 
focal firm i during the 4-year window after an alliance compared to total citations, where 
the total citations denote the total number of citations made by focal firm i in the time-
window. The effect of an alliance with a distant partner on exploratory innovation 
measured with the non-self-citation is positive and significant, as Model 5-1 shows in 
Table 3-6 (β=274.63, p<.05). The result is consistent with the result of the measure of 
new patent class entrance. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is negative and 
significant (β=-1896.72, p<.05) in Model 5-2, confirming support for Hypothesis 4b.  
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As another alternative measure for exploratory innovation, I used the diversity of 
citations’ patent classes which supplements the other two measures and constructed the 
Herfindahl index to capture the degree of concentration across citation classes (Miller, 
2004). The measure of citation diversity is the reverse ratio of the Herfindahl index, 
which is measured by the number of patent classes of citations and the number of total 
citations. Model 6-1 in Table 3-6 supports Hypotheses 2 (β=2.16, p<.05). An interaction 
effect of technological distance with network distance on exploratory innovation 
measured by the non-self-citation is negative and significant, in support of H4b (β=-15.07, 
p<.05). The results are consistent with the other two measures of exploratory innovation.  
Another dimension of patent quality is the generality of patents, which indicates 
the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent class j, out of n 
patent classes (Valentini, 2012). Therefore, if patent i is cited by subsequent patents that 
belong to a wide range of technological fields, the measure will be high, whereas if most 
citations are concentrated in a few fields, the measure of generality will be close to zero. 
A high generality score suggests that a patent had a widespread impact that influences 
subsequent innovation in a variety of fields. The results when measured with the forward 
citation for innovation quality are consistent with those of H3 and H4c.   
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TABLE 3-6: The Effects of Alliance Partner Network Distance on Innovation with 
Alternative Measures, 1996-2009, Results of 2SLS Analysis     
 
Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 6-1 Model 6-2 Model 7-1 Model 7-2 
H2 H4b H2 H4b H3 H4c 
 
Exploratory Innovation Innovation Quality 
Measures Non Self-citation Citation Diversity Patent Generality 
 Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction 
ALLIANCE CONTROL       
Cross-border Alliance  
 
-9.68 
(14.05) 
2.18 
(14.05) 
-.12 
(.13) 
.01 
(.12) 
.40 
(.26) 
.12 
(.29) 
Alliance Governance  
 
17.70 
(12.49) 
20.85 
(13.80) 
.14 
(.12) 
.17 
(.12) 
-.22 
(.21) 
-.38 
(.27) 
Technological Distance 
  
-105.44 * 
(53.20) 
5402.85 * 
(2459.29) 
-1.01 * 
(.44) 
42.67* 
(21.22) 
1.80* 
(.86) 
-111.28 * 
(46.54) 
Geographical Distance  
 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
NETWORK CONTROLS        
Structural Holes  
 
-8.53 
(10.63) 
-1.93 
(9.64) 
-.12 
(.11) 
-.02 
(.08) 
.22 
(.22) 
-.02 
(.19) 
Cluster Coefficients  
   
21.04 
(29.67) 
3.87 
(28.42) 
.15 
(.26) 
.02 
(.24) 
-.32 
(.53) 
-.06 
(.58) 
FIRM CONTROLS       
R&D Intensity 
 
-1.02 
(2.54) 
-1.04 
(2.66) 
.00 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.05) 
.01 
(.05) 
Debt Ratio 
 
-10.12 
(11.28) 
-3.00 
(10.42) 
-.03 
(.10) 
.05 
(.09) 
.18 
(.21) 
.03 
(.21) 
Prior Performance   
 
2.13 
(3.89) 
.32 
(3.83) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.03) 
.01 
(.07) 
.07 
(.08) 
INNOVATION CONTROLS       
Pre-alliance Number of ICL 
Class 
.13 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
- - - - 
Pre-alliance Non-self-citation  
 
.27† 
(.15) 
.57*** 
(.08) 
- - - - 
Pre-alliance Citation Class - - .65*** 
(.09) 
.78*** 
(.07) 
- - 
Pre-alliance Innovation Quality  - - - - .04 * 
(.02) 
.04 † 
(.02) 
Post-alliance Exploration  - - - - .00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
HYPOTHESIS EFFECTS        
Network Distance    274.63* 
(113.12) 
1820.71 * 
(821.08) 
2.16* 
(.99) 
14.44* 
(7.08) 
-4.98 ** 
(1.73) 
-37.42 * 
(15.54) 
Network Distance *  
Technological Distance  
- -1896.72 * 
(862.75) 
- -15.07* 
(7.44) 
- 39.04 * 
(16.33) 
Observations  534 534 534 534 534 534 
Groups 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Wald chi-square test for overall 
fit 
83.35 77.10 146.55 139.27 17.14 13.53 
Root MSE  60.91 63.76 .53 .55 1.13 1.30 
 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p <.01  *** p <.001  
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
The partner industry dummy control is included.  
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OLS Regression. As another set of robustness tests, I ran the OLS regression in Model 8-
1 through Model 13-2. Table 3-7 presents the OLS results for innovation consequences, 
using six different measures, including alternative measures of innovation quantity, 
exploratory innovation, and innovation quality. The results are generally similar to the 
2SLS results appearing in Table 3-4. An alliance with a close partner increases 
innovation quantity, whereas an alliance with a distant partner increases exploratory 
innovation. In addition, an alliance with a distant partner decreases innovation quality, 
thus failing to support Hypothesis 3. However, when a partner is both relationally and 
technologically distant, a focal firm is likely to have quality innovations. On the other 
hand, an alliance with both a relationally and technologically distant partner decreases 
exploratory innovation, as Hypothesis 4b predicted.    
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TABLE 3-7: The Effects of Alliance Partner Network Distance on Innovation, 1996-2009, Results of OLS Analysis     
 
Model8-1 Model8-2 Model 9-1 Model 9-2 Model 10-1 Model 10-2 Model 11-1 Model 11-2 Model 12-1 Model 12-2 Model 13-1 Model 13-2 
H1 H4a H2 H4b H2 H4b H2 H4b H3 H4c H3 H4c 
Dependent Variables Innovation Quantity Exploratory Innovation Innovation Quality 
Measures No. of Patents Patent Class Self-citation Citation Diversity Forward Citation  Patent Generality 
 Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction 
ALLIANCE CONTROL             
Cross-border Alliance  
 
29.16 
(24.63) 
27.74 
(24.63) 
-4.86 
(6.36) 
-5.48 
(6.35) 
-.10 
(4.69) 
-.26 
(4.70) 
-.01 
(.06) 
-.00 
(.06) 
.51 
(.49) 
.50 
(.49) 
.16† 
(.09) 
.15† 
(.09) 
Alliance Governance  
 
-8.85 
(20.20) 
-7.20 
(20.22) 
-13.27 * 
(5.22) 
-12.55 * 
(5.21) 
-4.31 
(3.87) 
-4.13 
(3.87) 
.04 
(.05) 
.03 
(.05) 
.07 
(.40) 
.10 
(.41) 
-.05 
(.08) 
-.02 
(.07) 
Technological Distance 
  
21.87 
(54.09) 
67.30 
(63.56) 
11.11 
(14.09) 
29.77† 
(16.53) 
3.29 
(10.28) 
8.30 
(12.01) 
-.27* 
(.13) 
-.49 ** 
(.15) 
-.07 
(1.08) 
.55 
(1.24) 
-.01 
(.20) 
.59** 
(.22) 
Geographical Distance  
 
.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 ** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
NETWORK CONTROLS              
Structural Holes  
 
-26.11 
(15.89) 
-25.26 
(15.89) 
.44 
(4.11) 
.75 
(4.10) 
-6.07 * 
(2.98) 
-5.90 * 
(2.99) 
.04 
(.04) 
.03 
(.04) 
-.13 
(.31) 
-.09 
(.31) 
-.19** 
(.06) 
-.15** 
(.06) 
Cluster Coefficients  
   
47.39 
(48.73) 
47.03 
(48.69) 
-7.36 
(12.66) 
-7.38 
(12.61) 
9.64 
(9.28) 
9.52 
(9.28) 
-.09 
(.12) 
-.08 
(.12) 
2.84 ** 
(.97) 
2.83 ** 
(.97) 
.22 
(.18) 
.21 
(.18) 
FIRM CONTROLS             
R&D Intensity 
 
-.97 
(4.61) 
-1.12 
(4.61) 
1.53 
(1.19) 
1.46 
(1.19) 
.16 
(.88) 
.15 
(.88) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.11 
(.09) 
-.11 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Debt Ratio 
 
-28.07 
(17.50) 
-30.37 † 
(17.57) 
-7.56† 
(4.52) 
-8.52 † 
(4.52) 
-3.91 
(3.32) 
-4.14 
(3.34) 
.10* 
(.04) 
.11 
(.04) 
-.33 
(.35) 
-.36 
(.35) 
-.12  † 
(.06) 
-.14 * 
(.06) 
Prior Performance   
 
7.55 
(6.65) 
7.40 
(6.64) 
1.99 
(1.74) 
1.96 
(1.74) 
1.35 
(1.26) 
1.31 
(1.26) 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
.18 
(.13) 
  .17 
(.13) 
.10 *** 
(.02) 
.09*** 
(.02) 
INNOVATION 
CONTROLS 
            
Pre-alliance Patent Stock  .61*** 
(.03) 
.60*** 
(.03) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
- - - - - - - - 
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Class Average Patent 
Quantity  
.35 † 
(.19) 
.34† 
(.19) 
- 
- - - - - - - - - 
Pre-alliance Number of ICL 
Class 
- - .25*** 
(.04) 
.25*** 
(.04) 
- - - - - - - - 
Pre-alliance Self-citation  
 
- - - - .57 *** 
(.03) 
.56*** 
(.03) 
- - - - - - 
Pre-alliance Citation Class - - - - - - .76*** 
(.04) 
.74 *** 
(.04) 
- - - - 
Pre-alliance Innovation 
Quality  
- - - - - - - - .21 *** 
(.04) 
.21 *** 
(.04) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
.03*** 
(.00) 
Post-alliance Exploration  - - - - -.07 * 
(.03) 
-.07* 
(.03) 
- - -.01† 
(.00) 
-.01† 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
HYPOTHESIS EFFECTS              
Network Distance    -64.36** 
(22.23) 
-51.49 * 
(24.16) 
-4.90 
(5.73) 
.37 
(6.22) 
-15.57*** 
(4.18) 
-14.04 ** 
(4.59) 
.10 * 
(.05) 
.03 
(.06) 
  -.21 .01 
(.48) 
-.26** 
(.08) 
-.05 
Network Distance *  
Technological Distance  
- -21.82 
(16.07) 
- -8.87*  
(4.14) 
- -2.44  
(3.02) 
- -.11 ** 
(.04) 
- -.31 
(.31) 
- .30*** 
Observations (Groups)  534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 
Groups 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-Square  .61 .62 .12 .13 .55 .55 .52 .52 .10 .10 .13 .17 
Root MSE  112.08 111.99 28.92 28.82 21.32 21.33 .27 .26 2.23 2.23 .42 .40 
 
† p <.1  * p <.05  ** p <.01  *** p <.001  
Standard errors are in parentheses.   
The partner industry dummy control is included. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
To contribute to prior research that has yielded mixed results regarding the 
relationship between alliance partner choice, alliance network configuration, and 
innovation, the current study extends our understanding of the relationship by adding 
a dynamic perspective and by exploring various aspects of innovation. This study 
investigates how alliance partner network distance affects firms’ innovative activities: 
innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, and innovation quality. I found that 
alliances with close partners increase innovative quantity through frequent knowledge 
flows, whereas alliances with distant partners increase exploratory innovation. In 
particular, by applying multiple measures for exploratory innovation, I identified the 
mechanism of exploratory innovation. Firms not only broaden their technological 
areas, but also spread their citation classes. Although the overall level of innovation 
quantity may increase with alliances involving close partners, the direction of that 
innovation shifts away from exploratory innovation and toward an exploitative search. 
This shift has critical implications for the long-term viability of firms. A firm's 
innovative quantity increases at a cost to some of its exploratory innovation, which 
can have longer-term consequences. In some ways, however, the effect of the 
innovation search is more vital to organizational evolution than to innovative quantity. 
Finally, innovation quality increases when an alliance partner is both relationally and 
technologically distant. The results imply that exploratory innovations and 
breakthrough innovations are distinctive. Exploratory innovations are created by non-
redundant information from relationally distant partners; however, a combined effect 
of network distance and technological distance lead to less exploratory innovation due 
to information overload, confusion, and diseconomies of scale. However, innovation 
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quality that may lead to a radical innovation is beyond exploratory innovation.. 
Exploratory innovation is simply new to a firm whereas innovation quality it is 
determined by market responses.   
 This study makes important contributions for research and practice. First, I 
reconcile the long-lasting theoretical debate between the benefits of structural holes 
and closure on innovation by examining the effects of network distance on 
comprehensive innovative activities. I provide a comprehensive understanding of how 
the trust that comes with close partners and non-redundant information from distant 
partners can affect subsequent innovations. The extent to which social capital exists in 
a firm’s network of alliances can increase the firm’s access to its partners’ knowledge, 
the motivation of its partners to transfer knowledge, and the efficiency of knowledge 
exchange and transfer (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005), resulting in more successful 
innovative quantity. However, for the sake of exploration, novel ideas from alliance 
partners are required over trust with partners. These findings contribute to the debate 
over whether trust or non-redundant information leads to more innovation.   
I also investigated how an additional alliance, rather than the cumulative 
effects of the total number of alliances, affects innovation, thus controlling for 
existing network structure. Given the important roles of indirect ties as channels for 
the flow of information and know-how, I contend that the underlying network 
structure in a dyad – the concept of network distance as captured in the current study 
– may influence innovation considering that both direct and indirect ties are 
theoretically significant. By linking the social mechanism and knowledge novelty 
from the network structure and the effect of additional direct ties, I have attempted to 
fill the gap in the existing literature.  
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These results have important practical implications regarding alliance partner 
choices. R&D alliances are a useful way to increase firm innovation. As prior 
literature on ambidexterity suggests (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), R&D alliances 
seem to contribute most to firms' innovations when they have a balance between 
distant and close partners in their alliance portfolio. The results imply that firms’ 
tendency to prefer embedded ties (Walker, Kogut, & Shane, 1997; Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Li & Rowley, 2002) may hinder long-term innovation. Therefore, managers 
should make an effort to search for nonlocal ties and to build strong relationships with 
distant partners.  
This study has limitations that future research may address. First, I suggest 
that partner distance is associated with trust and the quality of information that a 
partner brings; moreover, this study examines the innovation consequences with 
patents at the firm level. By nature, it is challenging to match a patent as an output of 
an alliance with the actual alliance. Future research may attempt to more directly 
relate innovation outcomes to network distance. A promising direction for future 
research would be to examine direct knowledge transfer occurring before and after the 
formation of an alliance and to confirm whether a new patent is related to the new 
partner’s knowledge stock.  Another approach to address this issue would also be 
innovation consequences at the patent level.  
Second, three dependent variables of the study are not independent. Network 
distance or other variables can have a similar influence on different innovative 
consequences.  This requires using models that accommodate potential correlation in 
error terms across the innovation quantity, exploratory innovation, and innovation 
quality equations in the study. In addition, testing hypotheses on the effect of network 
106 
 
distance on the different types of innovation consequences requires testing differences 
in the variables’ coefficients across innovation type equations at the same time. To 
address these issues, I would employ a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model 
with robust standard errors.   
Third, the impact of governance on innovation should be considered. With the 
use of an instrument, I rule out any direct effect of the instrument (strong corporate 
governance) on the dependent variables of different types of innovation consequences. 
However, previous literature suggests that here is some influence of corporate 
governance on R&D investments and innovation. In addition, postestimation tests 
suggest that I may have a weak-instrument problem. In a future study, I would 
implement another instrument that is exogenous and strongly correlated with the 
network distance.  
Finally, I measured innovation quality with the impact dimension of quality. 
The impact was measured by the number of forward citations. Highly cited patents 
represent highly influential innovations. However, prior literature measured 
innovation impact with alternative measures, for example, breakthrough innovation 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Breakthrough patents are much more enormously valuable 
as foundations for firms to build upon than highly impactful patents. To capture the 
distinctive nature of breakthrough patents, I would incorporate the alternative 
measures of breakthrough patents as well as patents’ general impact in future studies.  
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